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Dear reader,

A busy but successful year 2019 is coming to an end. A lot of hard work lies behind us and a lot is still to come. We will be the NATO stand-by JTF HQ in 2020, a task for which we just recently trained during Trident Jackal 19 as a precondition for our successful certification.

A very demanding and important exercise for all of us. Not only because we had to prepare it in a much shorter time than usual but also because we seized the opportunity to gain important knowledge and experience during our real deployment to Menorca. In the end, we succeeded because we were flexible, willing and capable to adapt to challenges and change.

Now, a huge variety of interesting articles are awaiting you. Some of them look back and reflect on the past in order to elaborate on how we can learn from it. Others focus on current topics or on the future. They discuss interesting aspects in various fields of expertise such as e.g. Information Technologies, doctrine or the effects of cultural changes. However, they all seek to open your mind and sharpen your intellect. HQ member or not, I am convinced, that you will enjoy this year’s NRDC-ESP HQ magazine.

At the end of this year, I will hand over my command over NRDC-ESP. I would like you to support my successor with the same kind of passion, professionalism and dedication you have shown during the recent years. It has always been an honor commanding NRDC-ESP and serving with each and every one of you. I enjoyed every minute of working side by side with you and I will always treasure these memories.

Eleven Nations – One Team!
Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team OLRT. Setting Conditions for Success

Brigadier General Dimitrios Tsipidis (GRC-A)
NRDC-ESP DCOS OPS

Response Planning happening at the HQ in Bétera, Spain. This article captures the importance of the OLRT mission in order to set the conditions for successful planning and execution of an operation.

We have heard many times that for a NATO Force Structure HQ to assume the role of operational/joint level HQ, the HQ must change its mindset from tactical to operational level thinking. The OLRT is the first element of the headquarters to make this leap since it is the first element of the headquarters to deploy into the operational area. To understand this, let us review how the decision to deploy the OLRT is made.

Although the OLRT members are direct representatives of COM JTF, they are also by extension representatives of SACEUR and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). Therefore, the OLRT must have unfettered access to the strategic documents produced by SHAPE and a full understanding of the NAC’s intent and rationale for NATO military involvement. Having a complete understanding of the political decision to employ a military option will help the OLRT identify the interests of the host nation where NATO forces will deploy, and how the interests of NATO might diverge. This is an important step towards understanding the environment and identifying possible dilemmas the commander might face upon his arrival in the area of operations.

In his classic diplomacy handbook, Sir Harold Nicolson describes the diplomat’s ideal traits: truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty. The nature of the negotiations and engagements the OLRT will perform requires its members to embody these traits. While interfacing with government officials, the OLRT must gain a solid understanding of how NATO’s strategic military objectives provided by SACEUR align with the political objectives of the host nation. In some cases, these interests do not exactly align, and the OLRT members must employ negotiation techniques to stay within the parameters of the mission without offending or alienating the host nation authorities.

The OLRT is a small team of specialists who deploy to a theatre of operations under a complex mandate, in order to understand that environment, assess what is needed there, and establish relationships to determine the success of a future operation or relief effort.

In the initial stages of crisis, NATO’s decision-making process needs accurate information in support of the Operations Planning Process. The OLRT is the primary tool of the Operational Commander, for contributing to the process of gaining early first-hand Situation Awareness by conducting liaison and reconnaissance in theatres of potential operations. Its role is to give expert advice on contingency planning and operational issues, ranging from force composition, through logistics, to command and control and communications. The team leader reports directly to the Operational Commander. The OLRT is also responsible for liaison and coordination with the host nation authorities, international organizations/non-governmental organizations (IOs/NGOs), and other stakeholders, in the potential theatre of operations in order to provide reliable and timely information to the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG). In addition, OLRT contributes to gaining early, first-hand situational awareness in theatre, facilitating the rapid establishment of liaison and conducting reconnaissance in a designated area. Thus, the OLRT has to interact with all of these stakeholders.

During Exercise TRIDENT JACKAL 2019, NRDC-ESP was certified as a Joint Task Force HQ ready to assume the standby role in accordance with the NATO Long Term Commitment Plan. But as with all certifications, the exercise began well before the September deployment to San Isidro Training Area, Menorca, Balearic islands. In June, the headquarters deployed an OLRT to the Joint Warfare Center in Stavanger (Norway) in conjunction with the Crisis

NATO Allied Command Operations (ACO) Joint Task Force Headquarters Standard Operating Procedure (JTF-SOP) 001 for Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Team, or OLRT, describes it as an “ad hoc multinational team held at high readiness state able to operate legally in an area or region that is yet to be designated as a future operating area.”

The deployment cannot normally be predicted to be a pre-determined size, duration, nor for a specific location. In all circumstances, the OLRT Task Organization, equipment and mission duration will be kept to the absolute minimum to remain responsive and agile. The OLRT will operate overtly but discretely, and requires a permissive threat environment while in a legally designated area or region. Regardless of any low threat assessments, the security of all elements remains paramount throughout the deployment.

The mission of the OLRT is described in short as “(…) Responsible to liaise and coordinate with the host nation authorities, international organizations/non-governmental organizations (IOS/NGOS), and other stakeholders, in the potential theatre of operations to provide reliable and timely information to the Joint Operational Planning Group (JOPG)”. It also notes that OLRT “contributes to gaining early, first-hand situational awareness in theatre, facilitating the rapid establishment of liaison and conducting reconnaissance in a designated area.”

Thus, the OLRT is seen as the JTF Commander and the JOPG’s tool to both gain information and establish liaison between the command and the foreseen host nation.

OLRT COMPOSITION

According to the NATO Joint Warfare Center JTF HQ Handbook, there are at least 10 different mission types that the JTF HQ on standby could be called to execute. The members of the OLRT must understand all mission types and contain subject matter experts ready to assess situations as diverse as humanitarian relief, disaster relief, peace support operations, enforcing embargoes, and more. The great challenge is to deploy a small team with the right expertise. If the headquarters intends to deploy 20 personnel for the OLRT, it must train 40 in order to account for the variety of missions the headquarters will face. Upon notification to deploy, the commander will select the correct talent from among the 40 or so prepared personnel to execute the OLRT mission.

The selection of the personnel cannot wait until the NAC authorises deployment. When SHAPE begins prudent planning for an emerging crisis, the COM of the standby JTF HQ should assemble his OLRT from the pool of trained personnel. This is how the OLRT becomes tailored to the mission.

OLRT TRAINING, ACTIVATION AND DEPLOYMENT

A well-prepared OLRT is able to begin to engage the “host nation” immediately after arriving in country.

Good initial preparation prior to deployment is imperative in order to allow a good chance of success in the typically ambiguous environment in which they will be engaging. To ensure the OLRT is efficient and credible, a comprehensive training plan must be developed, implemented and permanently reviewed to maintain the proper level of readiness. The program will aim to deliver common ground procedures and to build team spirit. Subject Matter Expert (SME) individual training and collective training is also required for OLRT personnel. Obviously, training will be conducted during the preparation period. The training includes individual and collective training. There are three different phases, as follows.

As with all military training, training of the OLRT is comprised of individual, collective, and leader training. Although the OLRT is likely to be comprised of senior ranking personnel (SOF3-S and OR8/9), the training program must include refresher training for some basic military skills. These senior personnel will not have junior NCOs available to execute the routine tasks such as operate a radio, so they must brush up on these basic level skills. This is particularly necessary since the team will likely be multinational, using equipment from the framework nation.

There are three key areas that must be addressed to ensure that a JTF’s OLRT is well-prepared for its mission: team-wide preparation; subject matter area detailed preparation; and command guidance documents. Some information must be clearly understood by all OLRT personnel as a whole in order to ensure that the team speaks with one voice to the host nation.

2 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015
3 JTFHQ [S01] 0001 30APR19
4 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015
5 JTFHQ [S01] 0001 30APR19
6 The Three Swords Magazine 28/2015
In Phase A the training is related to individual preparation, and educational training will consist mainly of academic sessions. The main topics of this training include negotiation techniques, CIMIC mechanism, leader engagement meetings preparation, dealing with interpreters, and interaction with Media etc. Also, Information Management – Technical Area Security Officer (IM – TASSO) training in preparation for the specific task as follows: CIS Shortfalls as interview techniques, internal work procedures.

The training must also be designed to practice the traits described by Nicolson through a system of engagements and negotiations with national governmental organizations as well as international organizations. Here it must be emphasised the point mentioned above – the OLRT is the first element of the JTF HQ to operate at the operational level. In fact, they are bridging the operational and strategic level during these engagements with government officials. As NRDC-ESP learned, during OLRT deployment to JWC, negotiating agreements with a sovereign government is a much higher and difficult category of engagement than most military staff officers are accustomed to. It is imperative to bring personnel with government level experience to assist with the engagement and negotiation training.

The engagements and negotiations also form a basis for collective training – how the note-takers, observers, and SMEs work together as a team during official meetings. Seminars designed to discuss world issues and studies of diplomatic procedures also serve as team building events and collective training as the team members will learn the biases inherent in each other, and how to overcome these biases.

It is now time to add one more important trait to Nicolson’s list – effective communicator. Because the OLRT members will have varying levels of fluency in English and may even need to communicate through interpreters, OLRT training must also include exercises to improve each member’s ability to listen, interpret, take notes, and respond during a discussion.

In Phase B, as pre-deployment preparation, the OLRT procedures (SPO) provide the designated members the opportunity to familiarise themselves with the “engagement activity” prior to an actual deployment. This training will last 4 or 5 days, and will consist of two parts:

Pre-deployment Preparation. More time is needed, to build team ties among all members: 2-3 days fully dedicated to tasks, “isolated” in one room with open talks, internal training and syndicate work (small groups of 3-4 pax), to present short briefs about Functional Area compositions within NRDC ESP.

Deployment Preparation. The JOPG will review previously prepared checklists and planning functions to identify and train administrative processes for a deployment to a designated location.

In Phase C, rehearsals will be conducted over a period of several days in which the OLRT executes the same steps as in phase B, but deploys to an offsite to rehearse the full scope of its responsibilities. It will focus on repeating the major topics presented during Phase A, and reviewing the internal procedures to expedite the actual OLRT deployment. Team-wide preparation is normally accomplished with formal briefings from the JOPG in conjunction with other SMEs in the dispatching headquarters. These briefings are important because OLRTs and JOPGs are often just beginning their working relationship with each other due to personnel turnover or ad hoc staffing. This set of formal briefings from the JOPG to the OLRT with command attendance should describe the areas that the command needs the OLRT to focus on.7

![Operational Liaison and Reconnaissance Training Team](image)

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**EXECUTION**

The OLRT, as the JTF commander’s earliest element in country, is charged with gathering information needed by the JOPG and evaluating the information based on their position as the only NATO personnel that are in country at the time. The sense or feeling of the host nation is best reported in analysis documents, telephone calls and video teleconference (VTC) meetings.

One of the tools for driving analysis is the post-meeting minutes that many OLRTs use to describe the various meetings that they attend during the day. The OLRT uses a template for post-meeting minutes that both answers the detailed questions that the JOPG needs, and provides information on the reliability of the personnel that they meet with, while at the same time reporting on the atmosphere of the meetings.

VTC meetings are very useful for the OLRT to report its understanding to the JOPG and to the Command Group because it allows an opportunity for both the JTF and the OLRT to have a two-way communication that can quickly clear up misunderstandings. It is especially helpful for the Command Group to have regular VTCs with the OLRT leadership to ensure that the commander is well aware of the atmospherics that the OLRT observes in country and to ensure that the OLRT is aware of the commander’s focus as the planning process progresses.

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7 JTFHQ [SCI] 0001 30APR19
The challenge to the OLRT is communicating information quickly and efficiently to the commander and staff at the home base. The NRDC-ESP OLRT deployed to Stavanger with 62 requests for information (RFIs) that the JOPG had determined necessary for planning. With only five days to gather the information and pass it to the JOPG, it is evident the NATO Exercise model of execution does not provide room for realistic training.

The challenge faced by the OLRT was to gather the information, analyse it to ensure an understanding of the situation, then communicate the situation to the JOPG. The JWC and SHAPE observers complimented the NRDC-ESP OLRT for twice-daily meetings that were used to share the results and key points of the engagements. This helped the entire team gain a shared understanding of the situation. The challenge was then communicating that understanding to the commander and the JOPG back at home station.

While the OLRT attempted to develop an understanding of the situation by piecing together information gathered from a variety of engagements, the JOPG was clamouring for information and answers to the RFIs. The impatience of the JOPG is understandable considering the compressed planning timeline. This tension between the JOPG and the OLRT will always exist, but each side must understand the pressures and limitations of the other in order for the tension to be beneficial to accomplishing the mission. Even though it can be foreseen that during an actual deployment the OLRT will have more time to develop an understanding of the situation, the COM and JOPG must maintain the pressure on the OLRT to communicate the situational understanding without delay.

### GENERAL OLRT ORGANISATION

The NRDC-ESP “Standing OLRT” consists of all personnel from the “C2 Element” and the “Base Team”. The deployed “Mission-Tailored OLRT” Task Organization will be developed from the “Standing OLRT,” reduced to the minimum number of personnel during Task Organization development, and augmented where required.

### CONCLUSION

While the foregoing observations and ideas have come from the experience of NRDC-ESP, they should not be taken as the final word on how to conduct OLRT training or execution. OLRT training is not an isolated event. It’s part of the whole HQ preparation. Standing HQ should be aware that once the OLRT is deployed it will take time to get results, apart from exercises artificialities, and they will not have the answer to any question at the very beginning. At the same time the Key Leaders Engagements maintained by the OLRT are focused on “big questions” not in small details (such as the longitude of an airport runway, available in international documents).

The OLRT is an organization that can be tailored to the mission of the JTF headquarters and commanders can be as creative as necessary to build their OLRT organizational procedures to maximize efficiency in gaining information and developing liaison structures needed for mission accomplishment. Hopefully, future OLRT organizations will be able to use some of the thoughts in this article to enhance the training of their teams.
INTRODUCTION

Leaders across the globe agree “the character of war is changing significantly.” So is the operating environment, which now requires more flexible and adaptive organizations at every echelon. Change is not new, but the speed of change is forcing organizations to evolve. Whether a warfighting Corps, Land Component Command (LCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) Headquarters, addressing battlespace management (BSM) gaps, is a way to create quick, impactful change. There is an immediate need for a trained cross-functional element, to plan and execute multi-dimensional BSM, delivering joint effects at the right place and time, in support of the maneuver commander. To achieve this, headquarters must take a multidisciplinary approach to doctrine, organization, and training.

BACKGROUND

Exercises and operational examples continue to validate the necessity for a more comprehensive approach to battlespace management. With this, there is an increased demand for synchronized kinetic and non-kinetic actions and effects. The ability to decisively shape the battlefield non-kinetically is greater than ever. For this reason, many headquarters are re-organizing their teams to prepare for current and future operating environments. Over a year ago, NRDC-Spain’s Battlefield Management Cell (BMC) within the OPSCOORD, initiated actions to determine how to more effectively manage battlespace – both physical and non-physical – in a modern, complex operating environment. While the aim was clear, the end state was not. With a small core team and the support of the headquarters, the goal was to gather as much information as possible, identify any gaps, and provide recommendations. The following is a summary of the approach and findings.

NRDC-SPAIN APPROACH

I. DOCTRINE

Until the publication of the AJP 3.0 in February 2019 there was no NATO doctrine guiding JFCs and below in the conduct of battlefield management. The AJP is useful, but adolescent, requiring immediate implementation and testing in an effort to further refine it. While headquarters are making great strides to overcome this with Standard Operating Instructions (SOI), Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), conferences, and workshops, they cannot only rely on doctrine to accelerate their ability to manage the battlespace. As a start, the AJP outlines the main elements of battlespace management as:

- Coordinating and synchronizing the activities of force elements, including non-NATO actors;
- Contributing to situational awareness and freedom of action; and
- Mitigating friction caused by the existence of boundaries and seams between force elements and between the joint force and other actors.

Given the lack of doctrinal guidance at the start of the study, the BMC team collected information from other sources in the form of one BSM Annex and five Corps SOIs from across the NATO Command Structure. The team used the information in these documents as a baseline for the study. Next, recognizing the need for cross-functional input from across the Headquarters, the team initiated BSM Working Groups, represented by all staff sections/functions. The aim of the working group was to gather input for the SOI on how to more effectively manage modern battlespace. This BSM Working Group met every other week and took a bottom-up approach in order to start with the basics and avoid assuming anything. The working groups covered all of the domains – Air, Land, Maritime, Space, Time, Cyber, and Information. They were facilitated by the BMC team, but led by the domain subject matter experts (SME). Upon completion of the working groups, the BMC was pleased with the results and could move forward with the study and SOI production.

2. Multi-dimensional at complex, physical & cognitive, kinetic & non-kinetic.
3. Multidisciplinary: drawing from multiple disciplines to re define and solve a problem.
II TRAINING

Recognizing the need for training, the BMC team developed a Headquarters BSM training plan. The aim of the training plan was twofold: First, to build the capabilities of the core BSM team within the BMC, and second to re-organize into a cross-functional team to implement developing doctrine. The core team initiated the training plan, assuming “you don’t know what you don’t know”. As result, the core team expanded their knowledge and understanding, by attending seminars, talking with other SMEs, and expanding the network to build a community of interest. Next, in order to build and train the cross-functional team, NRDC-Spain programmed multiple training events designed to progress from individual to collective training. Additionally, when possible, BSM training objectives were key outputs as part of Headquarters training events. These training events provided an opportunity for the Headquarters to implement, track, and validate the re-organization and training of new doctrine and concepts.

III KEY FINDINGS

During the Working Groups and training plan execution, there were several key discoveries. The most valuable were in the areas of deep operations, air-land integration, and battlespace.

DEEP OPERATIONS

During the study, the team wrestled with the role of the Headquarters in deep operations at the tactical and operational levels. AAP 39 defines deep operations as:

*Operations conducted against forces or resources not engaged in close operations. They expand the battle area in time and space, help to shape the close battle, make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and diminish the coherence and tempo of his operations*.

Effective deep operations have the following characteristics: simultaneity; combined arms effort; accurate, reliable, and timely intelligence; continuous target development and refinement; and deliberately planned. As a warfighting Corps, LCC, or JTF Headquarters, it is critical to understand the role of the headquarters in supporting and shaping for subordinate units in the close fight. This will help the staff prioritize and synchronize the employment of their wide range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities. While battlefield geometry is critical, cognitive domains provide depth to the operational level headquarters. Key points include:

- Deep operations require well-trained, disciplined, cross-functional teams that understand BSM and have the ability to synchronize the employment of kinetic and non-kinetic actions and effects in time and space.
- At the operational level, deep operations must not only include tactical level battlefield geometry, but also cognitive domains, with emphasis on time and space.
- At the operational level, the Joint Coordination Order (JCO) cycle likely defines the depth of your deep operations. At the tactical level, the 96-hour Air Tasking Order (ATO) cycle and physical battlefield geometry likely defines the depth. Beyond this is likely too deep. (Figure 1)
- Kinetic and non-kinetic actions must be synchronized in time and space to achieve a desired effect.

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AIR-LAND INTEGRATION

To support the maneuver commander with component or joint effects, headquarters should have systems and processes to integrate the air and land component operations. This process must begin with cross-functional planning and carry forward to a cross-functional execution team within the OPCEN. For a warfighting Corps, this may include an Air Support Operations Center (ASOC)-type entity to assist with Command and Control (C2) of shared air-land users. NRDC-Spain implemented the Joint Fires and Airspace Management Cell (JFASM C) in an effort to address this need. Because this cross-functional team is located in the OPCEN they require a planning backbone to ensure operations are synchronized as much as possible prior to execution. When manned and trained, the JFASM has the representation to make changes to plans during the execution phase. Although not a controlling entity, the team is equipped to manage the air and land domains in real time. Key points include:

- Air-land integration requires a well-trained, disciplined, cross-functional team that understands BSM with the ability to manage large volumes of users in the air and land domains. This begins with planning and continues all the way through execution.

- Air-land integration requires shared risk between the Air and Land Components, communicated and owned by each. Who owns what risk? When? Why?

- Delegating some airspace to the Land Component (to be defined) assists with reducing the volume of fires the Air Component is required to approve, and provides the maneuver commander some increased flexibility that may have an impact on time. The United States model using the coordinating altitude may be an example to draw from.

- The JFASM C (or similar) successfully integrates air and land domains during the execution phase.

BATTLESPACE

The demand for more flexible and adaptable headquarters has also led to the evolution of Command and Control Command Posts (C2CP) concepts within the Graduated Response Forces-Land (GRF-L) community. Command Posts are now smaller, mobile, and have a reduced footprint. Arguably necessary, these adaptations present new challenges for BSM. Centralized planning becomes more challenging and de-centralized execution requires adherence to all the principles of mission command philosophy (shared understanding, prudent risk, mission orders, mutual trust, clear commander’s intent, and disciplined initiative). Battle tracking and synchronizing actions and effects, throughout a fluid battlespace, places increased demands on smaller, geographically dislocated staffs. Additional impacts from, and to, the Host Nation (HN), International Organizations (IO), and Non-governmental Organizations (NGO) demand cross-functionality within the headquarters. Key points include:

- Evolving C2CP concepts and inherent battlespace demands require a well-trained, disciplined, cross-functional team that understands BSM and has the ability to battle track, synchronize, and prioritize actions and effects in the physical and cognitive domains. This includes physical and non-physical boundaries.

- There must be clear authorities and delegations throughout the battlespace to accommodate geographically dislocated operations and CPs.

- There is no substitute for traditional battlespace management – boundaries, control measures, graphics, etc.

CONCLUSION

As seen with the evolution of the C2CP concepts across multiple headquarters, BSM requires a thorough review and emphasis. BSM is not only a G3/G35 Operations problem, but is a comprehensive puzzle requiring all combat functions and tasks resident across the staff and adjacent component commands. Given the increasing complexity of the operating environment, the non-physical battlespace will likely be contested prior to the physical domains. To succeed, good staffs must prioritize multidisciplinary approaches to problem-solving and synchronize both kinetic and non-kinetic actions and effects. While BSM is not unique, with supporting doctrine, proper organization, and training, it can have impacts across domains and functions. Similarly, creative staffs that explore underdeveloped disciplines can identify new, unique, challenges and solutions, perhaps previously undiscovered. This information can then be shared across the NATO enterprise for collective growth, ensuring all are prepared to address the challenges of the next battlefield in the ever-changing character of war.
Air Land Integration: The JFASM Cell and the GLEs Roles in our HQ

Lieutenant Colonel Francisco T. Martínez Ramirez (ESP-A) in collaboration with the NRDC-ESP G3 AIR branch. COS Military Assistant

INTRODUCTION

In order to better understand the meaning and the roles of both the Joint Fires and Air-Space Management Cell (JFASMC) and the Ground Liaison Element (GLE) in our HQ, we certainly need to clarify the concept of Air Land Integration (ALI).

The ALI is a particular form of interoperability between the air and land components. It describes the creation and execution of simple operational and tactical plans by land and air forces, synergistically blending land and air power across all activities, from ISR to fires, manoeuvre and sustainment. ALI is a concept that requires: a strong relationship built over time, effective training and resourcing, an awareness of joint capabilities, and detailed co-ordination and liaison between air and land components. The requirement for interoperability is defined by the answers to three questions: With whom? To what level? And in what functions will force elements organize for operations?

The NRDC ESP HQ GLE is an element of our G3AIR section inside the G3OPS branch (OPS DIV). Its mission is to establish the liaison and interface with the Joint Force Air Component Commander, during operations at JFAC HQ, in order to facilitate the coordination and synchronization of air and missile operations in support of the NRDC-ESP HQ. Its principal responsibility is to ensure that the Air Component Commander and his staff understand NRDC-ESP HQ Cdr’s intent and scheme of maneuver.

THE NRDC-ESP JFASMCs ROLE

BACKGROUND

To understand the current status of the JFASMC, it is necessary to start from the beginning of this HQ and the evolution of this Cell.

HQ NRDC-ESP was created in 2001 under the umbrella of the Spanish “Cuartel General de Fuerza de Maniobra” (Manoeuvre Force HQ) located in Santo Domingo barracks (Valencia city). It was split into two different HQs: the national HQ, keeping its former name, mission, and manning levels, and the NATO HQ, initially named as HRF (L) HQ. This NATO HQ was created, based on the ARRC HQ structure and procedures, but was “customized” in accordance with Spanish national means and capabilities.

As for all HQs, the operations center is one of the key elements of the HQ. For this reason, Spain ensured that the HQ operations center was properly manned (mainly PE, even the representatives from branches) and received equipment, including a tent, big enough to incorporate all the required personnel and means and new tactile screens.

After several years of experience and lessons identified, in 2005 the HQ concluded that it was time to start reviewing structures and concepts. As a result, the FCOORD (Fires Coordination, the former Fires & Targeting “F&TGT”) and G3 Air (which initially was a separate branch from G3OPS), supported by AOC, started to think on how to more effectively organize their three sections in the Current Ops timeframe. Initially, these three branches had one representative each, working close together and sharing information, but they did not encourage decision-making that could affect the development of the operations.
In fact, only the AOCC representative had access to the Air C2 tool (ICC), while the other branch representatives acted as liaisons between the OPSCEN director and their own branches.

LAST UPDATE

The workshop was supported by almost all the branches in the HQ (G1, G2, G3, G4, G6, DOS, MILENG, F&TGT, AOCC, and IAB) and focused on the following areas: JFASMC mission, tasks, manning requirements, and CIS support equipment.

The workshop determined that the JFASMC should be a mission-tailored cell with a fixed basic structure for every HQ role (Corps, LCC, JTF), with some of the SMEs required permanently, some on call, and some not even required at all.

The evolution of Functional Area Services (FAS) has been tremendous in the last few years and most of the users need specific tools to work in the JFASMC. The most critical are ICC and JTS/FAS (Joint Targeting System/Nato FAS for Dynamic Targeting and Time Sensitive Targeting). In addition, other important cells such as the Personnel Evacuation and Coordination Cell (PECC) and the Personnel Recovery Coordination Cell (PRCC/JPRC) should join the JFASMC in order to be able to carry out medical evacuation or personnel recovery missions.

Our next challenge is realistic training for the JFASMC during CPX exercises. This requires a powerful response cell dedicated to running injections related to current ops with air and fires involvement. Injects should require coordination with: the simulated ATO and ACO, current ground operations, and through CIS radio means organized in the air and fires networks used for those purposes (air traffic control and fire control). NRDC ESP conducted additional training with the support of the Spanish Air Force, allowing our JFASMC to join and simultaneously train during the exercises used to certify the Spanish JTACs.

We are still in the initial steps while GRFS, HQs and AIRCOM HQ continue to discuss how to better execute air-land integration. Some HQs are supporting the USA ASOC (Air Support Operations Centre) model, which implies a high level of manning, training, and equipment demand that should be approved by the nations.

FIRST APPROACH

In response, the whole OPSCEN was fully reorganized in 2005 and a new cell was created within it: the Joint Fires and Air Space Management Cell (JFASMC). The purpose of the new JFASMC was to coordinate the execution of fires and all actions requiring the use of airspace. This new cell, led by the former FCOORD, was integrated by the leader, two additional permanent members from FCOORD, two from G3 Air (Air Space management and Army Aviation), one UAV rep, two AOCC representatives, along with other on-call members.

This approach was used from 2005 until 2016, under the different HQ roles, with good exercise evaluation results. Unfortunately, the HQ has never tested the JFASMC in real life. In 2015, during the LIVEX phase of exercise Trident Juncture, airspace control responsibility in San Gregorio training area was delegated to NRDC ESP HQ and was executed successfully, but the JFASMC realized that it was not properly manned and equipped. Again, these lessons identified, prompted a HQ internal workshop to redefine the JFASMC.
CONCLUSION

Air-land Integration is crucial for any modern operation. To achieve this, there must be mutual knowledge, common procedures or interoperable systems among other things. In short, we wish to highlight the importance of having “joint teams” working at both levels. These teams (JFASMC, ASOC, AOC, JAGIC - “Joint Air Ground Integration Centre”), regardless of their names, have very similar missions and tasks and can be adapted in accordance with the mission and role of the HQ.

THE NRDC ESP GLE IN THE JFAC HQ

BACKGROUND

A critical part of the “joint team”, the JFASMC, requires complementary joint capabilities. Equally important is the GLE (Ground Liaison Element), which is deployed by the Land Forces in the JFAC headquarters. Its role is to materialize the air-land Integration.

EVOLUTION

Former NATO doctrine and procedures established that every Corps HQ should deploy a liaison team (Ground Liaison Element, GLE) into the JFAC HQ (both in the CAOC and in the ACC HQ in case they were separated). Besides, for a multi-Corps Army/LCC, this higher echelon was also required to deploy a liaison team (Battlefield Liaison Element, BLE) responsible for coordinating and integrating the respective GLEs from Corps, in order to have only one voice representing ACC staff and the JFAC commander. Apart from the BLE and GLE there was a permanent Army detachment in ACC HQ called the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE), a Land/Army advisor to JFAC Commander and every year we conducted a one-week training course for the GLE members (two from the peace establishment plus several essential augmentees), who paid several visits, and supported each other in seminars and exercises.

Some years ago, with the changes in the NCS, AIRCOM developed a new AIR C2 CONOPS (Command & Control Concept of Operations) with a JFAC HQ core. It also developed different missions and tasks for the CAOCs and a process to build up the JFAC HQ in accordance with the operation. This CONOPS establishes the GLE as the component level representative within the JFAC HQ that can be supported by liaison officers from Land Forces if required. The CONOPS states that the BCE is an integral part of the JFAC staff, is subordinated to the LCC Command, and provides coordination between the JFAC and Corps HQs at the tactical level.

On the other hand, according to the AJP 3.3 (B), the Land Liaison Element (LLE) is functionally subordinated to the LCC and acts as its representative within the JFAC. The AJP goes on to say the Battlefield Coordination Element (BCE) is an integral part of the JFAC, serving as an agent between the JFAC and the LLE to ensure effective operational cooperation. Comparing both documents, we can appreciate that apart from the name of the liaison element (GLE vs LLE) there are some contradictions between the BCE mission and the level of working (tactical vs operational).

The NRDC ESP GLE has experienced several deployment exercises since 2002, in different national and multinational air agencies, under both air C2 organizations, and has adapted the GLE structure and procedures based on the following lessons identified:

- It should be led by an OF5 rather than an OF4 with the proper knowledge of the LCC HQ, the LCC OPLAN and the JFAC procedures.
- It has to be supported by a team capable of working in the different Divisions of the JFAC HQ, mainly in the Combat Ops Division (COD) and in the Combat Plans Division (CPD), but, if possible, also in Intelligence, in Support and in the Strategic Division (SD).

Aircrafts are generally faster than surface vehicles and can often route directly to a target or destination.

Defensive Counter-Air (DCA) operations protect friendly forces and vital interests from adversary Air and Missile attacks.

JFAC COMMANDER

In the initial steps of this HQ and for several years, every CRF HQ was affiliated to a different CAOC in NATO, mainly focused on training and coordination. NRDC ESP was affiliated to CAOC 8 (current CAOC TJ)
Early integration in the Air Operations Planning Group (AOPG) is crucial in order to understand the support the LCC can expect from the JFAC and to exchange the view of the operation from the land perspective to the air planners.

The liaison team must be well trained in air doctrine, procedures and Air C2 systems.

Once deployed, the LLE/GLE must be actively involved in explaining the COD and CPD, the Land operation, and must recognize the support needs.

The BCE should be the peacetime Land advisor to the JFAC commander, and point of contact for the LLE/GLE staff members. It could also be integrated in some of the GLE positions in the JFAC, such as SD, COD and CPD representatives. The LLE/GLE could also integrate some LOs from subordinate Corps.

Support the coordination between LCC-air-space-use requirements and air-space-control measures/restrictions in ACO (Airspace Coordination Order) and Air Space Control Plan (ACP).

Support the coordination of LCC air defense with the JFAC as Air Defence Command.

Ensure that LCC requirements are included in the ATO (Air Tasking Order) development process and monitor and update current ATO.

Provide the enemy ground picture, and friendly ground picture (situational awareness) to the JFAC.

Monitor targeting developments.

Facilitate the exchange of intelligence data between the JFAC and the LCC.

Coordinate and exchange information between LCC and the JFAC about the JPDA (Joint Prioritized Defended Assets List) and the JPSTL (Joint Prioritized Targeting List) to help refine and validate targets for attack and to support Combat Assessment.

Coordinate LCC requirements and provide advice on AAvn.

As an example, the USA army has several Battlefield Coordination Detachments (BCD) organized, trained and permanently deployed into JFAC /AOCs to execute similar missions and tasks. This is a good solution but requires personnel, equipment and training on a daily basis. These requirements may not be realistic for some nations.

CONCLUSION

The liaison team from Land forces is crucial for the JFAC HQ to enable them to better understand and support the Land Operations and it must be a unique team, integrated in all the JFAC HQ Divisions. It is important that a permanent Land member or “reduced team” is appointed as advisor to COM JFAC in generic Land operations and as door opener for the Liaison team deployed from Land forces. Training and mutual knowledge among Air and Land staffs are key for success. Experience in recent exercises has demonstrated the importance of ICC knowledge and training for the Land Liaison members. Although the desirable level of representation among CCs is OFS, it is more important that the empowered person has the right knowledge of Land operations and ALI activities. CRF HQs can perform different roles (NRF, LCC (single Corps), LCC multi-Corps HQ, Corps HQ or JTF HQ) and although in most of them the mission and tasks may be quite similar, it is necessary to define the air-land integration and liaison requirements for each role.

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1 Up to 3 separate ATOs will be in planning/execution in JFAC HQ’s Ops (execution) and Plans Division (24/48 hours).

2 There are three constituent components to Combat Assessment: Battle Damage Assessment (BDA), Munitions Effectiveness Assessment (MEA) and re-attack recommendations.
C-IED at Operational Level: Attack the Networks and Technical Exploitation

During the last year, more than 14850 Improvised Explosive Device (IED) events occurred around the world. IEDs are so widespread that they have become a global threat. IEDs enable adversaries (terrorists, groups, insurgents...) to strike without being directly engaged. Local populations, national authorities, security forces, IOs, NGOs, infrastructures, commercial institutions, etc. are targeted by adversaries to achieve psychological effects, trying to demoralize civilians by creating feelings of insecurity and damaging the cohesion between the population and the legitimate government.

The C-IED staff approach the IED as a holistic problem and aim to defeat the IED system (the personnel, resources and activities necessary to plan, execute and exploit an Improvised Explosive Device event). An effective C-IED approach aims to destroy or dismantle this system by incorporating four key elements: isolation of the IED system from its external sources of support, interdiction of the IED system to disrupt the adversary's IED capability, weakening the strategic effect of IED usage in the cognitive dimension, and, finally, mitigating against the potential of IEDs and neutralizing deployed IEDs as part of Force Protection (FP).

As is easy to deduce from this concept, C-IED will never be an issue solely for the C-IED cell or even the Protection area in this HQ. Most branches have something to contribute, to counter this threat which concerns not only the physical aspect (the device) but also the cognitive, informational, diplomatic or civil-military ones. The C-IED cell will link and coordinate all efforts to effectively defeat this system.

C-IED doctrine is supported by three pillars: Prepare the Force (PtF), Defeat the Device (DdT) and Attack the Networks (ATN) with a solid foundation of Understanding and Intelligence.

The first two pillars can be considered as a reactive position against the IED threat to minimize, counter and mitigate the IED effects, whilst the third one represents a proactive or offensive one.

An example of the cross-staff nature of C-IED, when considering Prepare the Force it’s not just an issue for training (G7), equipment and resources management (G4 + G8 personnel equipment, vehicles) or jammers (G6). When considering Defeat the Device, MILENG provides an essential contribution (EOD, Route Clearance capabilities, Military Search) but also G3 contributes by developing effective TTPs or updating the current ones (Lesson Learned process). It is in the tactical level where all these are paramount.

What about Attack the Networks? This pillar rises directly from the foundation (Understanding and Intelligence).

Behind an IED event there is a complex process where many people plan, finance, resource, coordinate and, finally, execute an attack, which if successful, will be exploited for propaganda purposes to discredit the adversary. These people, means and activities and the relations between them are the so-called IED system which, graphically represented, looks like a network. But the network won’t be the only one, because most of the time the users of IEDs will develop a full range of activities to achieve their goals where IED attacks will be just one of their TTPs.

1 ASP 3.21 Military Police. MP doctrinal functions are mobility support, security, detention, police and stability policing.
It’s clearly necessary to understand the structure of this system (local, national, transnational), its financial support, logistic flow, manpower, training capabilities, propaganda media, etc. This requires an important intelligence effort and... time to understand the IED system, collect information and after analyzing, to be able to effectively determine their vulnerabilities and to isolate and degrade the adversary IED capabilities through the targeting process.

It is at the operational level where Attack the Networks reaches its full meaning: It is only a Joint operational HQ that owns full capabilities to link with the host nation to provide and require support to defeat the IED system, to coordinate component commands, to attack the IED system, to ensure diplomatic and political efforts are made to isolate the IED threat from external influences, etc. Legal arrangements to deal with the arising IED threat are essential not only to attack the system specifically, but also to provide legitimacy to the Alliance and the host nation government, which subsequently will be key to gain the narrative of the conflict and the population support.

The role played by the host nation liaison officers inside the Joint HQ is important to ensure full coordination between both partners, but in C-IED matters they can be crucial: every success against the IED network will have a positive impact on the local authorities, strengthening their position while weakening that from the threat.

To coordinate all C-IED efforts, the C-IED element has a forum where all HQ branches are invited to share their C-IED concerns. It is the C-IED Working Group. In this forum, all branches share their requirements and information while providing expertise in relevant issues. Though all HQ branches are members, G2, MILENG, EW and FP have a key role and most of the time the meeting will be tailored in accordance with the issues to be considered.

Another key aspect of the C-IED element in the operational level is its contribution, in coordination with the intelligence branch, to control the C-IED exploitation process.

Exploitation consists of “taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical or strategic purposes”, in this case from an IED event. There are three levels of exploitation within the NATO technical exploitation system: Level 1 (Field/Tactical), Level 2 (Theatre/Operational) and Level 3 (Out-of-Theatre/Strategic). The final objective is to obtain information which will be processed and analyzed to feed the Intelligence Cycle.

Considering C-IED, in level 1, the Weapons Intelligence Teams (WIT) are responsible for collecting evidence from the scene to be managed, for further exploitation in upper levels and, if possible, for preserving them in conditions which allow judicial prosecution. From their on-scene perspective, WIT is able to provide tactical commanders with assessments of their current own TTPs to react to the adversary. In level 2, the Technical Exploitation Laboratory will contribute decisively providing biometrical and forensic analysis which may allow identification of the members of an insurgent cell and technical assessment about the characteristics of the IED (explosive charge, main components,...) which allow, for instance, new threat technologies or a threat frequencies table to be determined.

The C-IED cell will be responsible for disseminating this information to all HQ branches and subordinate units inside the Joint Operations Area (JOA) in order to feedback, check and, if necessary, change their own TTPs, and consider new material or new capabilities for our forces. Outside the theatre this information will contribute to checking the training and education of own forces and suitability of our resources.

If you have paid attention to this article, I’m sure you will have identified the key role of technical exploitation at the operational level, feeding into the Defeat the device, Prepare the Force and Attack the networks pillars. In other words, the close existing ties between C-IED and technical exploitation at operational level.
Exercise “ÁNGEL GUARDIÁN´19”
Multinational Military Police Taster

Lieutenant Colonel Eugenio E. Trigueros Sanguino (ESP-A)
G2 INTEL 2X MP-Security Chief

BACKGROUND
The Spanish (ESP) Military Police (MP) Battalion (ESP MP Bn) is the NRDC-ESP unit which provides MP support to the HQ. Since 2011, this unit, has organised the “Ángel Guardián” exercise, and this year is not different. This exercise, which started as an attempt to share experiences, procedures and tactics among different Spanish Military Police units coming from a great variety of Commands, has become a modest international reference in the MP Community of Interest (Col). MP Units belonging to the ESP Army, Navy, Air Force, Royal Guard, Emergency Military Unit and other Commands based in Bétera (Valencia) participated, along with other MP units from other NATO and partner countries.

The exercise is focused on small units: platoon/squad/teams. The intent is to provide them with different scenarios and vignettes in order to practice specific tasks and activities related to the five NATO MP functions¹. Since the participating units have significant differences in doctrine, procedures, equipment, weapons, etc the exercise does not pretend to establish a unique approach and solution to the scenarios/vignettes, but to share their best practices and experiences, and ultimately, for everybody to learn from other MP colleagues. During the exercise, the planning process at the platoon level is also taken into account in all tasks, allowing the commanders of the units to prepare the actions and to deliver proper orders to the team well in advance. Finally, a secondary but also crucial objective of the exercise is to promote stronger bonds among MP units from allied and Partner nations.

This year a parallel activity to the exercise was carried out at the same facility. Working dogs are often linked to MP tasks and soldiers. The “MP’s best friend” deserved a dedicated event in which it was the focal point. Hence the Spanish Military Police Battalion (MPB) organized the First Working Dog Seminar. In this event high qualified experts from the Armed Forces, University, and Local and National Police delivered specialised conferences and created the appropriate forum for discussions and for examining the subject in more depth. As well as conferences, demonstrations were performed by dog handlers from ESP MP Units and civilian police.

PARTICIPATION
This year, as a training audience, there have been 400 soldiers, a quarter of them belonging to countries other than Spain. They were grouped into three different MP companies with four platoons in each one. Each platoon consisted of 30-35 MPs. The platoon organisation was on the premise of being as multinational as possible, in order to share experiences, but also to discover the challenges of a Multinational MP unit working together.

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<th>TRAINING AUDIENCE</th>
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<td>UNIT</td>
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<td>Air Force MP</td>
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<td>Navy MP</td>
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<td>MP Prison service</td>
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<td>Royal Guard MP</td>
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<td>Emergency Unit MP</td>
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<td>Div 1 HQ MP</td>
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¹ AJP 2.1 Military Police. MP doctrinal functions are mobility support, security, detention, police and stability policing.
But we should not forget those whose participation was vital for the success of the exercise. Other ESP units provided their specialised support for the proper development of the vignettes/stations - for example the Helicopter Unit supporting Close Protection Team (CPT) tasks, the NRBC unit supporting with a decontamination station, the Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) team supporting all C-IED related tasks, the CIMIC unit supporting simulated tasks related to displaced personnel, etc. In addition to that, a great number of role-players were needed to simulate all the vignettes/stations as well as translators to facilitate the international participation.

Finally, the whole ESP MP Bn was involved in the organization of the exercise and Working Dog Seminar, and therefore they could not contribute as part of the training audience.

Furthermore, an observer program was prepared for those countries that wanted to have a closer view of the exercise before deciding whether to send a participating unit.

In summary, the event had almost 800 people working together, in what was a real logistic and coordination challenge for the organizers.

Since the first AG exercise, it has attracted the attention, not only of the MP Col, but also of the rest of the Armed Forces. We may say that the MP capability is the great unknown, and the exercise has served as a “loudspeaker”, expanding awareness of MP units and capabilities, or at least, making commanders aware of this combat support element. In that sense this year his Majesty King of Spain Felipe VI wanted to be present and followed very closely the activities of the MP units. He was curious, and engaged in all explanations, and at the end he expressed his satisfaction and gratitude for the high standards of the involved units.

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<tr>
<th>SCENARIO ACTIVITY</th>
<th>RELATED TASKS</th>
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<td>Group 1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vignette 11</td>
<td>Traffic control</td>
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<td>Vignette 12</td>
<td>MP patrols/active shooter</td>
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<td>Vignette 13</td>
<td>Displaced center</td>
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<td>Vignette 14</td>
<td>MP station CP</td>
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<td>Group 2</td>
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<td>Vignette 21</td>
<td>CPT</td>
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<td>Vignette 22</td>
<td>Eviction</td>
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<td>Vignette 23</td>
<td>Border control</td>
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<td>Vignette 24</td>
<td>Temporary security</td>
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<td>Group 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vignette 31</td>
<td>CP security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vignette 32</td>
<td>Bomb factory/MP raid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vignette 33</td>
<td>MP C-IED exploitation level 2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vignette 34</td>
<td>Convoy escort/WIT</td>
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Figure 4 A great variety of tasks and activities.

Figure 3 “8 Casa de Su Majestad el Rey”. His Majesty King Felipe VI attended AG19

STRUCTURE AND EXECUTION

The exercise took place from 15th–21st June in the Bétera Military Base and other military installations and training areas in the vicinity. The ESP MP Bn prepared 12 different vignettes/stations where the companies and platoons had to perform the assigned tasks. The vignettes were divided into three groups, and each company worked all day on one group of vignettes. The following day the companies rotated and started working on another group of vignettes. Every day, each platoon could work on a vignette during the morning and a different vignette in the afternoon. In this way all platoons worked on at least 8 different vignettes, without repeating any of them. The table below lists all the vignettes, which provides an idea of the variety of training MP activities available for the participating units.

2 Observer countries and organizations: GER, AUT, BGR, EGY, UAE, EST, HUN, NLD, POL, PRT, ROU and MP CoE
On this occasion, some innovations were introduced in the exercise with the intention of extending the variety of vignettes/stations and creating other scenarios. Among them it is worth underlining the following:

- The ESP MP Bn created a new vignette/station whose aim was to show the role of MP soldiers in a Level 2 exploitation laboratory. This has a close relationship with the vignettes of C-IED procedures and WIT. The model followed by the ESP MP Bn was the Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (JDEAL). The roles of MP in the laboratory are evidence custodian, forensic expert and assistant, and photographer. MP may also act as exploitation manager and commander or deputy commander of the lab.

- Some of the vignettes simulated a NATO country, as in an art 5 mission, which implies a different approach when carrying out their activities.

- The official templates for MP reports used in the exercise were those developed by the MP Centre of Excellence in an attempt to improve interoperability in a Multinational MP unit.

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

It is a fact that units coming from outside Spain face some important challenges, such as budget, transport of equipment, weapons and vehicles, long distance movements, language barriers, etc. Nevertheless, the ESP MP Bn has tried to ease some of those inconveniences, in order to facilitate their presence. Within some limitations, the MPB may provide weapons, vehicles and drivers and some special equipment (like Crowd and Riot Control gear and equipment).

There are not too many opportunities for MP units from different countries to train together, and in that sense, AG exercise provides the conditions to practice a great array of MP tasks and activities for small MP units. Due to this lack of opportunities, Spain decided to offer AG exercise to the participation of other allied and partner nations and is willing to host his allies and partners in subsequent events.

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3 AIP 3.5 C-IED ed C. v1, Feb 2016. Level 2 exploitation is more detailed and is known as theatre exploitation which may comprise a complete deployed field laboratory with a technical and forensic exploitation capability or a smaller mobile lab with a limited exploitation capacity.

4 JDEAL is a project of the European Defence Agency whose ambition is to provide contributing Member States with a multinational training facility and to generate sufficient capacity for the enduring employment of up to two Technical Exploitation facilities in order to support missions and/or operations at the theatre Level or below. Currently there are 13 member nations (Spain is one of them) and 4 observer nations.
"Gender" is used as a term to define the flexible and changeable social constructed expectations related to roles you learn and perform in the society as both women and men. Looking at gender aspects in military operations is relatively new for Armed Forces worldwide. However, nowadays sexual violence in the context of armed conflicts is recognised as an international security issue. Thus, women have become a military objective because of the growing and generalised use of gender violence as a weapon of war. Since 2000, it has been a priority for the United Nations, which in Resolution 1325 declared that "peace is inextricably linked to equality between men and women". A few years later, it was put on the military agenda, reaching the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Headquarters (NATO HQ) in Brussels. Currently, NATO has adopted a gender policy based on UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS), resulting in the updated NATO Allied Joint Doctrine for the Civil-Military Cooperation AJP-3.19 Edition A Version 1.5 framework to understand how important it is to consider a gender perspective in today's military operations.

The UNSCR 1325 recognises the significant role that women play in the processes of prevention and resolution of armed conflicts, and highlights the value of women’s involvement in humanitarian responses, and it declares the necessity of equal participation and full involvement of women in all levels and efforts so as peace and security can be successfully maintained. In addition, the UNSCR 1325 encourages all key players to take special measures in order to guarantee the protection of women and girls from gender-based violence. In today’s complex security scenario, the complementary capabilities of male and female personnel are also essential for NATO's operational effectiveness, particularly given the increasing complexity of civil-military interaction, public relations and obtaining intelligence.

It is a fact that wars have different effects on men, women and children. All too often, conflicts cause great harm to the civilian population, especially to those who are particularly vulnerable. Gender based crimes such as gang rapes, trafficking of women and girls, slave trade, forced marriages and the recruitment of child soldiers are often used as warfare strategies. This is why they have to be assessed as an important part of the operational environment, just as the type, strength and behaviour of the opposing forces.

Integrating gender perspective into a NATO mission as part of overall efforts to improve the stability to the local society wherever the Alliance is deployed, is a force multiplier to identify and mitigate risks and vulnerabilities to the male and female civilian population, caused by operations. More fundamentally, implementing a gender perspective is done by adapting action following a “Gender analysis”, which can be understood as “methods used to understand the relationship between men and women in the context of the society”.

Within NATO, gender perspective is an interconnected theme, with responsibility lying at all levels. In order to help focus commanders and staff, NATO has created a gender advisory structure to support NATO Commanders and Operations/Missions within NATO Command and Force Structures. The diagram below (fig.1) represents a typical Gender Advisory structure as it relates to the planning and conduct of an operation and/or mission.

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4. Gender Makes Sense: A Way To Improve Your Mission, Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) 2013. "Gender analysis" is defined as the systematic gathering and examination of information on gender differences and social relations in order to identify and understand inequalities based on gender.
The Gender Advisor (GENAD) role is to support the Commander, Command Group and staff in integrating gender perspective into the military contribution of decision making, function and processes. This includes distributing relevant information and analyses on gender perspective that support operational plans, operational assessments, collective training exercises, mission execution and situational awareness. For this purpose, the position of GENAD at HQ NRDC-ESP was introduced in 2013 during EX HIREX 13 as part of the NATO Comprehensive Approach concept. Since then, gender perspective implementation in military operations has been taken into account in following exercises (EX Trident Jaguar 14, EXs Trident Juncture 15 and 18) with participation of both civil and military Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) within the HQ NRDC-ESP structure.

Crucial to the effectiveness of the GENAD is to report to and have direct access to the Commander and the Command group. In this regard, it is worth mentioning that it is the duty of the HQ NRDC-ESP GENAD to be involved in the working and planning process from beginning to end. Given that commanders and their staff may not always be fully trained and skilled in the planning and execution of operations with an integrated gender perspective, GENADs at any level are needed to ensure that gender perspective is an integrated part of planning operations. He or she must be ready to support through specialised expertise, similar to the political advisor (POLAD), legal advisor (LEGAD) and cultural advisor (CULAD). GENAD contributions can, for instance, take the form of comments, assessments or judgements included in different documents such as: Joint Coordination Order, Operation Order, GENDER annex and appendices and Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) estimate, among others.

To guarantee that the gender perspective is taken into account across the whole HQ, all Functional Areas (FAs) must have Gender Focal Points (GFP). While GFPs are not specifically trained as GENAD SMEs, they should be offered courses on the subject of “gender in operations” and learn what to watch out for in their respective field. By doing so, they are expected to work together and in close support with the GENAD in order to ensure that the military action taken by the HQ incorporates gender perspective. In its role as Joint Task Force (JTF) HQ, NRDC-ESP is the highest tactical level of command with operational capability ready to run any military operation under minimal standards of gender perspective implementation, as it has been recently certified by the NATO Joint Evaluation Team during EX Trident Jackal 2019 (TRJA 19).

In the certification process of NRDC-ESP as JTF HQ, NRDC-ESP is in compliance with the requirement to have a NATO qualified GENAD in accordance with the Bi-Strategic Command Directive 40-1.7 In order to achieve such a requisite, NRDC-ESP GENAD attended the GENAD Course I/2019 at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT)8 conducted from 11-22 February 2019. The course covered the integration of gender into the NATO operational planning process and NATO policies.

In conclusion, although a gender perspective is neither a “magic bullet” nor the answer to every question or challenge in military operations, it is a perspective that will create better situational awareness and substantively contribute to reaching the goals of international obligations of working towards a more equal society and making the use of military forces more effective. For instance, the use of gender-separated data in reporting enhances planning and execution processes for military operations, adding value to assessments and comments throughout the gender analysis cycle.

Integrating a gender perspective into military operations is logical in terms of promoting both justice and effectiveness. The ability to implement gender perspectives at all levels in military operations increases with the presence of more women in international operations. Depending on the mission and the security situation, female soldiers are needed and employed as “female searchers”, as part of female engagement teams (FET) or mixed engagement teams (MET). Through the inclusion of women, all measures can contribute to a better understanding of the operational environment and the protection of forces. For example, reporting on the level of engagement of women in combat provides a basis to the Commander who may decide to include more women associated with fighting forces in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs.

In the future, the HQ should further intensify cooperation on gender issues with its subordinate units, as well as within the HQ itself across its FAs. The network of GENADs and GFPs must reach all the way down to the lowest tactical level, in order to transform the strategic goals of NATO into measurable tactical success. When new units are assigned to HQ NRDC-ESP, it will be essential to carry out an initial examination of what gender advising structures already exist and how these can be applied and exploited during the mission.

All in all, the need for integrating a gender perspective into NATO military education and training will result in an improvement of the military capabilities in conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, thereby helping to create advantageous conditions for the desired end-state of the conflict.

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7 Bi-strategic command directive (Bi-SCD) 40-1: integrating UNSCR 1325 and gender perspective into the NATO Command Structure, dated 8 August 2012.
8 The Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT) prepares individuals and groups, national as well as international, for Peace Support Operations (PSO) in the framework of UN, NATO/Partnership for Peace (PPP) and EU missions. It is located in Kungsangen (Stockholm), Sweden.
An Offensive River-Crossing Operation: Wagram 1809

Colonel Philippe Potin (FRA-A)
ACOS MILENG

Wagram is not the most famous among the battles of the Napoleonic era, but it is still celebrated in the French artillery and may also be, in the engineer corps, because the success of the river-crossing operations was the key for victory.

In 1809, the main body of the French army is deeply involved in Spain. It is the opportunity for Austria to take revenge for its recent defeat, against Napoleon in 1805, at Austerlitz. Financially supported by England, the Austrian army starts the conflict by crossing the boarder with Bavaria, France’s ally, on 9th April 1809. Back in Paris from Spain in January, Napoleon unites with the army in Germany on 15th April. The beginning of the campaign is a little confused, but as soon as the emperor is back in business, everything goes fast and well. The Austrian army withdraws in the face of the French offensive. The capital city of Vienna is occupied by Marshall Oudinot on 13th May. But the Austrian army is not completely defeated, it is still strong, with 100,000 soldiers under a capable and experienced commander, Archiduke Charles. The Austrian army evacuates Vienna and crosses the Danube river. They are now north of Vienna, in the plain of Wagram, in defensive positions, waiting for the French army to attack.

ESSLING

They are not going to wait too long. Napoleon wants to defeat the Austrians as quickly as possible, not allowing time for Austrian reinforcements to come from Italy, who are being followed at a distance by the French army in Italy, commanded by General Mac Donald. Napoleon is over-confident and underestimates the Austrians. To join forces with the Austrian army, the French must first cross the Danube river. The Danube river is wide and has three main branches: the first is 400m wide, the second, where the current is at its fastest, around 2 m/s, is 200m wide, and, in the third branch, only 15m separates Lobau island from Essling. In addition, the river is in spate and its level is capable of changing suddenly from 6m to 9m in depth.

The campaign is so fast that the pontoon bridges have not followed. The sappers and artillerymen in charge have to improvise and use Austrian equipment, made of wood, and boats found in great quantity in Vienna. A first narrow bridge is opened at noon on 20th May and the corps of Marshall Masséna can therefore cross the river. The Austrians are not inactive and they launch floating mills, loaded with

1 River-crossing operations are shared between artillery for the floating bridges and engineers for the fixed bridges. It is only in 1894 that the responsibility for river-crossing operations will be totally transferred to the Engineer branch. At Wagram, Major General Lauriol is commanding the artillery and Major General Bertrand is the chief engineer.
stones, and set on fire, against the bridges. On 20th May, a bridge is cut at 17:00 and repaired at 03:00 the next morning. It collapses again at 10:00 on 21st May and it is repaired at 15:00. During that time, the battle begins, but the French units cannot launch any attack because they don't receive the reinforcements and the ammunitions expected. For example, the corps of Marshall Davout, consisting of 50,000 soldiers, cannot be deployed on the other side of the river. In spite of the efforts of the artillerymen, sappers and sailors, two bridges are destroyed again on 22nd at 07:00 and repaired at 16:00. Finally, a last breach the same day can only be fixed on 25th May. During that time the battle is lost. With heavy losses, the corps of Marshall Masséna repulses all the Austrian offensives on 21st and 22nd May, but in the end, it must withdraw in Lobau island.

LOBAU ISLAND

Napoleon cannot afford such a defeat. Revenge is necessary. But it will be carefully prepared this time, using Lobau Island as an operational base. Marshall Masséna receives the mission to transform the island into a huge ammunition and supplies depot for future operations. The island, covered with woods, is well protected from external views. In secret, General Rogniat, the sapper in charge, builds fortifications and roads, and erects artillery batteries to facilitate the future river-crossing operations. Major General Bertrand, the chief engineer, under the direct supervision of Napoleon, organizes the river-crossing sites. Fixed bridges on piles, wide enough to facilitate the crossing of two vehicles, are built to double the floating bridges (see map). The crossings are secured by a fleet of ten armed ships, which received the mission to counter all Austrian attempts to break the bridges. In a month all the works are finished.

THE CROSSING

The Austrians are expecting a river crossing in the direction of Essling as was the case in May. An attack launched on 2nd July on mill island confirms this idea. But the real attack is planned at the level of Alexandre island, on the opposite side, the night between 4th and 5th July. On 4th July, the orders are given. Three floating bridges are ready to be launched. One of these, the Heckman bridge has been built on a canal behind Alexandre island. It is in one piece, articulated with ropes in 4 parts, 162m long, and built on 14 pontoons. At 20:00 on 4th July, a violent storm with heavy rains begins. It lasts all night long, as the operations, in coordination with a huge artillery fire, distribute the Austrian fortifications and batteries. First, a beachhead is conquered by 1500 infantrymen on assault boats, around 01:30 on 5th July. The Heckman bridge is then extracted from the canal, launched in the current, and by a circular motion, reaches the enemy bank. The infantry can cross now. In total this complex and technical operation has taken only five minutes! The two other bridges are subsequently erected. One

is finished at 02:00, the other is ready at 05:00. At dawn, the two corps of Marshalls Davout and Masséna are on the battlefield.

WAGRAM

The battle lasts two days: 5th and 6th July. It is a victory for the Great army of Napoleon, but is a difficult one. Thanks to the use of the big battery, 104 guns, and concentrating their fires on the centre of the Austrian army and destroying it, it is possible for the troops of General MacDonald, to break through the Austrian line and defeat them. It is this unusual use of artillery, a tactical innovation, that is nowadays celebrated in the French artillery. The sappers, artillerymen and sailors in charge of the bridges, also have reason to celebrate. Their contribution is a major one, in something that today, we refer to as, a combined or even a joint operation.

REFERENCES

- F.G Hourtoulle « Wagram l’apogée de l’Empire »,
- Colonel Roche « Le Génie ». 

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6 This concentration of artillery is under the command of Colonel Drouot, who later became General. He was normally commander of the artillery of the Guard.
SOF MINDSET
The Historical Principles Are Still Found in NATO

Lieutenant Colonel Juan Navarro Fernández (ESP-A)
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ORIGINS OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS

It’s possible the Origins of the Special Operation Forces (SOF) were during the Second World War (1939-45) when Great Britain created a range of special units that undertook a variety of daring operations against the Axis powers. Perhaps those origins were long before, during the Spanish War of Independence (1808-14), when small selected groups conducted night incursions against high value enemy targets. Perhaps some would argue that the raid on Nottingham Castle (1330) to overthrow Queen Elizabeth, carried out by a group of men during the night, infiltrating through an underground passage, might be considered a Special Operation.

Throughout history, these kinds of units have been a necessity of the most audacious - those who wanted to achieve the effect of surprise, and those who needed to affect the adversary’s center of gravity in an unexpected way. No matter how they named these units, the thing to note is that all of them share many principles that have remained relevant to this day.

THE MISSION

In all the supposed origins of SOF, there are common features in the missions carried out by these kinds of units. To highlight two of them: the high risk posed not only for the force but also for the mission itself, and the great impact of its execution.

When Edward III risked his life and the future of his dynasty attacking Nottingham Castle, the effects achieved were nothing less than a change of the English monarch.

When the British Commandos acted in Norway during WW II behind enemy lines neutralising critical infrastructures, in addition to the damages inflicted on German logistics, they made the enemy believe that the Alliance intended to retake Norway, thereby forcing Germany to divert hundreds of thousands troops to protect the country instead of employing them in other fronts where were needed. The effects were strategic.

Today, the AJP-3.5 Allied Joint Doctrine for Special Operations, states that “Special Operations deliver strategic or operational-level results or are executed where significant political risk exists”.

The main historical Mission features are still found in NATO.
THE ENVIRONMENT

From the beginning, these missions have been conducted mainly in environments where the enemy was controlling the situation. We did not confront the enemy from our own controlled areas looking to weaken or expel them, but rather infiltrated the heart of their territory and damaged their most valuable assets. In order to do so, the quantity and quality of the available intelligence regarding the area where the operations would take place, obviously played a crucial role.

When Lieutenant David Stirling, founder of the Special Air Service (SAS), sent his patrols during WW II, to neutralize vital infrastructures of the Axis powers in Africa, he was forcing them to operate deep inside the enemy lines. Of course they needed the appropriated information with regards to those targets.

When Jerónimo Merino, one of the main Spanish Guerrilla leaders during its Independence War, guided his groups of guerrillas to disrupt Napoleonic logistic convoys or couriers, he had to manage accurate intelligence regarding those movements, and develop raids in areas outside his control.

Nowadays, the AJP-35, says that “Special operations are normally conducted in uncertain, hostile, or politically sensitive environments to create effects that support achievement of strategic-operational comprehensive objective”, “...SOF rely on accurate, current INTEL to ensure that plans precisely meet the situation in the intended target area”.

The historical environmental characteristics where SOF missions have taken place are still found in NATO.

THE OPERATOR

To work in this environment we need “Special Operators”, it does not mean necessarily that they have to be the best warriors; it means that they have to possess specific features to perform in a satisfactory manner in challenging situations.

Of course, the Operator has to be in very good shape: the infiltrations and extractions through unknown terrains and using specialized techniques; the carrying of all weapons and equipment needed; the exposure to different weather conditions and the harshness of his or her isolation; all need an appropriate physical condition. But it is commonly agreed that this is not the most important characteristic. Qualities such as mental strength, self-confidence, self-control, resilience and the ability to perform well under pressure provide the operators with the tools they need to succeed in their assigned missions and the specific environments.

In every imaginable origin of the SOF, those operators had to have these “special” qualities - to face the loneliness, the unforeseen contingencies, the great variety of different skills needed, the extreme weather conditions, and to be able to withstand the pressure of the risk or importance of their missions.

In the past, those men were selected from the army or the resistance movement, based on former performances where they had shown those “special” qualities somehow. Today, the prestige of the different selection courses developed all over the world to recruit operators for SOF units is well-known.
CONCLUSION

NATO is constantly evolving to adapt to new threats. This is logical, otherwise it would not be a useful organisation. But it does not mean that its roots, the things that somehow give it its identity, have to be changed with every evolution. Of course, like any other characteristic, these roots have to be constantly analysed and evaluated in order to check that they continue to be meaningful, but keeping in mind that if the roots of the tree, which provide the necessary food are cut, it will die.

SOF units have always been required, even in times when this concept was still unknown, there was a need to perform daring actions in hostile environments with selected men. Participating in conventional wars like WW II, supporting resistance movements throughout history or fighting insurgency and terrorism as in recent decades. Some things have remained unchanged since the beginning, and above all of them, the SOF mindset, which allows the SOF community to adapt to new situations, to innovate with audacious solutions, to handle adverse situations and to withstand the most difficult conditions.

From this NRD-ESP HQ viewpoint and the role of JTF that it is currently undertaking, this SOF shared mindset by all the SOF community, plays an important part in the effective integration, coordination and resolution of any matter addressed by the different stakeholders involved in SOF issues (SOFAD, SOCC, SOPLE and NSHQ), and therefore in providing a more timely and efficient support to the JTF.
Deep Operations and Targeting: From Theory to Practice

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Have you ever heard of the saying, "Commanders must think deep"? What does that really mean and, more importantly, why? The concept of deep operations is mystifying and often misunderstood. Confusion exists because the concept of deep operations varies by branch of military and by echelon. As such, deep operations continue to be a nebulous concept within NATO due to the lack of unifying joint doctrine to serve as a conceptual foundation for understanding. Therefore, is it possible to conduct the targeting process focused on deep operations if shared understanding of the "deep" does not exist? The intent of this article is to clarify what deep operations means for a JTF HQ and explain how targeting serves as a tool for the commander to "think deep." The JTF HQ, commander and all functional areas, must have a shared understanding of deep operations to conduct the targeting process effectively.

DEEP OPERATIONS DEFINED

The NATO Handbook of Land Operations Terminology, AAP-39, defines deep operations as "operations conducted against forces or resources not engaged in close operations. They expand the battle area in time and space, help to shape the close battle, make it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and diminish the coherence and tempo of his operations." The manual further defines the deep area as "an area forward of the close area that commanders use to shape enemy forces before they are encountered or engaged in the close area." Both definitions are "Not NATO agreed" and are geographic or land centric. In a traditional sense, the definitions support the battlefield framework for a linear environment at the Component Command level. However, this is not adequate at the JTF level.

At the JTF level, deep operations is more than a framework, it is a cognitive state of mind. It is simple to associate the deep area with terrain, but difficult to correlate deep operations within a campaign plan. The phasing construct assists with framing a campaign plan, but is insufficient in delineating the "deep area." Within a campaign plan, decisive conditions can occur simultaneously, concurrently, or sequentially. This requires an asymmetric application of assets and resources, which is not limited to the military, but includes interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations.

Deep operations serve as a framework to focus the commander cognitively in time, space, and purpose. In doing so, the staff should refer to the "deep area" according to those functions. (Deep Area = (time) + (space) + (purpose)). Within a campaign plan and referring to the "deep area," the JTF HQ should frame time in weeks or months. This is not to be confused with planning horizons; however, the deep area normally lies within the mid-term planning horizon. Space associates with a specific geographic location common to friendly forces, adversaries, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental organizations, and civilians. Space also refers to the Space and Information Operations dimensions of warfare to account for the physical and virtual battle area. This encompasses cyber and information warfare.

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1 There is no common definition for deep operations within US Joint Doctrine.
2 Within a campaign plan, the "deep area" may differ for each line of effort along the continuum to achieving the desired endstate.
Joint Targeting is the process of determining the effects necessary to achieve the commander’s objectives, identifying the actions necessary to create the desired effects, selecting and prioritizing targets, and synchronizing a variety of capabilities to generate the range of physical and psychological effects. While carrying out an action remains a tactical event, the effect must be relevant to the JTF’s operational objectives.

When considering the “deep area” within a campaign plan, the staff should focus on achieving the effects necessary to attain the decisive condition. As stated previously, this normally lies within the mid-term planning horizon. An innate characteristic exists with all individuals in focusing attention to current operations, or the close area, which some may call the “CUOPS Vortex”. The CUOPS Vortex can be so strong that the commander and staff lose sight of the “deep area” and succumb to focusing on the tactical fight.

Targeting is the conduit to assist the commander and staff with thinking “deep” to ensure they are not consumed by the tactical close fight. Targeting enables the synchronization of lethal and non-lethal effects to achieve decisive conditions in the “deep area” along each line of effort within the campaign plan. This may be asymmetric or non-linear, which is why deep operations are a cognitive mindset for a JTF HQ.

THE WAY AHEAD

Understanding deep operations and targeting is not learned through reading, but requires repetitions in training. Targeting is a tool for the commander to influence and shape deep operations. As stated previously, component commands may have different definitions or interpretations of what they consider deep operations. Likewise, it is common for functional areas and staff to have different interpretations as well. However, as a JTF HQ, there can only be one interpretation of deep operations translated to the subordinate commands and staff. The commander drives this through his direction and guidance and then facilitated by the staff. The means to gaining proficiency requires shared understanding and practice. “Think deep!”
Mission Command - A Powerful "Non-Lethal" Weapon to Face the Future

If it makes you think, I have achieved my goal.

Over the past 100 years, Mission Command has been the paramount leadership principle of German Armies. It is not considered as a Combat Function but as a Command Philosophy to be applied by Commanders at all levels of command. Its origin goes back to the Prussian Army Reform in the early 19th century while the concept was developed in the last quarter of the 19th century and started to become fully implemented into doctrine, education and training from the beginning of the 20th century. Since then, the German Armies have had vast experience exercising Mission Command on a daily basis and it has proven to be a very powerful instrument while commanding military forces.

A famous quote from German doctrine in 1906 describes how subordinate commanders and soldiers should ideally be - "We have no use for soldiers without a will of their own, we need self-confident men who use their whole intelligence and personality on behalf of the Senior Commander’s intent”.

Mission command requires mutual trust between superiors and subordinates. Subordinates must be willing to assume responsibilities and develop initiative, and superiors must be willing to accept mistakes, and provide the required freedom of action to the subordinate. While the commander provides his/her intention regarding the mission, with achievable objectives and the required resources, the subordinate assumes the responsibility for execution. For mission command to succeed, it is crucial that subordinates understand the superior commander’s intent regarding their mission and are educated and trained to act independently. The implicit requirement imposed on superior commanders is to give their subordinates only essential orders, and to be extremely rigorous, absolutely clear, and very succinct in the expression of their commands. The classic German approach calls for every commander to be trained to function effectively at two levels of command above his appointment.

This concept may sound quite simple but it comes with special requirements to be implemented in an Army in order to successfully apply Mission Command. Additionally, some challenges that we are facing today and probably tomorrow make it more difficult to apply the principles of Mission Command.
REQUIREMENTS

The first two requirements are common leadership principles based on common education. The principles listed above have to be integrated in the education of every soldier, in particular, in career courses at all academies/schools, and at every level. If you read a book about painting, you are not automatically a good painter; a lot of training and experience improve your skills. The same is true when applying Mission Command successfully; you have to train and do it every single day.

The third requirement is a common (military) culture. This is quite easy to achieve within your own national Army but it is much more challenging in a multinational environment in which different military cultures come together. If the idiosyncrasy of an Army does not allow one to act independently IAW the commander’s intent, or freedom of action for subordinates in general is limited, and subordinates only have very limited responsibilities, (always having to ask the leadership to approve minor details), then you will not educate the individual to act independently based on his own initiative utilizing the best sense of Mission Command.

A common language is essential for success. In a multinational environment this is usually the English language. This requires a native speaker to use a level of language which can be understood without a Harvard degree and it requires the non-native speaker to desire to improve his language skills whenever possible. In any case, it is not important how the sender of the information intended to get his message across, but how the receiver of the information has understood the message.

Common doctrine and procedures are two other important requirements which are usually published in NATO documents. A common and sufficient understanding of the principles and procedures are essential to turn them into action IAW the mission and adjusting them IAW the situation “on the ground”. Independent action of a subordinate can be the rule only if it is based on professional skills, where the subordinates consider themselves to be, and really are experts in their fields. Only in this way, can the subordinate be empowered to make decisions. If the results of decisions are positive, the level of trust and the autonomy for taking decisions can be increased. If the result is negative, you have to go back to training processes and procedures.

EXAMPLES

An analysis by the US Army of the 1939 German campaign in Poland found that “The emphasis which the Germans placed on the development of leadership and initiative in commanders during the years of preparatory training brought its rewards in the Polish campaign. With the knowledge that these principles had been properly inculcated at every level, all commanders, from the highest to the lowest echelons, felt free to carry out their missions or meet changes in situations with a minimum of interference by higher commanders. They recognized that “initiative, flexibility and mobility” were the essential aspects of German tactics.”

After the execution of the Manstein-Plan in 1940, Field Marshal von Manstein stated that “The most important factor was the Command Philosophy. No other Army provided the same level of Freedom of Action to Officers and NCOs and down to the single Infantry men. This was the secret of success.”

One of the most prominent examples is the attack against Fort Eben-Emael in 1940. Paratroopers, in 11 gliders, were to land on top of the fortress, eliminate any defenders attempting to repel them, use the shaped charges to destroy the large caliber weapons, and defeat any counterattacks until German infantry and armour arrived. Nine remaining gliders successfully landed on the roof of Fort Eben-Emael. On top of the fortress Oberfeldwebel (OR-6) Wenzel emerged from his glider and assessed the tactical situation.
He quickly realized that two gliders were missing, one which included the commanding officer. Oberfeldwebel Wenzel assumed command, on top of the fortress, and became aware of the impact of the two missing German gliders. He immediately issued additional mission orders to the German paratroopers to assault the casements assigned to the missing two glider sections. He then organized a hasty defense for the expected Belgian counterattack and reported the mission status. Within 20 minutes of the glide assault landing, the 70 German paratroopers rendered Belgium's most modern fortress, garrisoned by more than 800 soldiers, useless.

The impact of Oberfeldwebel Wenzel's mission orders and success, quickly became apparent. The neutralization of the Eban-Emael fortress allowed infantry and armour from the 18th German Army to bypass other Belgian defenses and enter Belgium.

My personal experience in exercises and real operations has resulted in the firm conviction that applying Mission Command is a very powerful "non-lethal weapon" to employ forces more successfully and gain time in order to maintain the initiative.

Back in 1983, I participated in a REFORGER LIVEX ("CONFIDENT ENTERPRISE 83") as a member of a Supply Company. We had to redeploy, with our platoon, seven times over 14 days, including the reconnaissance of the new supply points, in civil terrain. Only oral mission orders were given, and the time needed for giving the orders was reduced from, initially one hour, to only 10 minutes.

In the fight against the flooding of the river ODER (1997) which in Germany was called "the flooding of the century", I acted as Chief OPS CEN of the Division which was responsible for the whole operation. We had to employ about 10,000 soldiers in the AOO. We applied the principles of a Defense operation, identifying the river water as the "enemy". As the principles of Defense were perfectly clear, we were able to keep the FRACOS to employ forces from all Services of the German Armed Forces, to a size of about 4-6 pages with a few annexes. The consequent use of Mission Command proved to be essential for mission success.

During the flooding of the river ELBE (2002), I commanded a Battalion-size Task Force (TF) of about 1,000 soldiers. During the two weeks of deployment, including the deployment of the TF from different locations in Germany to the AOO, we did not issue any written FRACOS, but only short oral orders, during one daily meeting, at the TF level and by phone. We could only do it in this way because we were relying on the principles of Mission command.

In 2002/2003, I commanded the DEU NSE, being part of SFOR in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Apart from some administrative orders, we did not issue any relevant detailed FRACOs to employ the units. Based on the given mission, the subordinated units executed their tasks without any relevant interference from the higher command.

**CHALLENGES**

I would argue that applying Mission Command in the past was much easier than nowadays. Even if you meet all the requirements listed above, there are some challenges which we have seen increasing over recent years. We have to accept these challenges, but also need to mitigate their unfavorable consequences as best as possible.

Based on the fact that complexity and uncertainty are, and continue to be, two important prevailing factors in Land Operations, we can still say that the change of situation, in particular, in Collective Defense (CD) operations, is an enduring important factor to be taken into consideration, while exercising Command and Control (C2) over military forces. Even if our highly sophisticated sensors and operational tools, try to minimize the "fog of war" on the battlefield, by providing very detailed and comprehensive information about all factors in the PMESII and TESSOC domains, we must bear in mind that the complexity of current, and potential future operations, is increasing, and some uncertainty remains. We might be able to further reduce the "fog of war" by using even better technology in the future, and avoiding and being aware that, too many details and too much comprehensive information creates "fog in our brains" as a result of information overkill. Do we really need OPLANs that are 800 to 1,000 pages to C2 a joint force with a division-size land force? Does the complexity of today require laying down principles and procedures in OPLANs in order to ensure that the mission is executed IAW doctrine? Or, is it a lack of solid doctrine, constantly changing procedures and the non-existence of interoperability that require “a book” to be published for an operation? How many pages would we need for a CD Major Joint Operation plus?

Information and regulation overkill is not limited to military life but is also evident in the civil environment. However, as General Sullivan (Former Chief of Staff of the US Army) once said, “The paradox of war in
the Information Age is one of managing massive amounts of information and resisting the temptation to overcontrol it. The competitive advantage is nullified when you try to run decisions up and down the chain of command. All platoons and tank crews have real-time information on what is going on around them, including the location of the enemy, and the nature and targeting of the enemy’s weapons system. Once the commander’s intent is understood, decisions must be devolved to the lowest possible level to allow these front-line soldiers to exploit the opportunities that develop.” I couldn’t agree more. In particular, in CD operations it is about gaining time to react and act against the enemy and let decisions be taken at an adequate level where the relevant “ground truth” is. As Mission Command can be applied at all levels, from the strategic, to the lowest tactical levels, the level where decisions are taken, depends predominantly on the adequate availability of information. While the analysis of social and other media, and the reaction to it, is more relevant at higher levels of command, the ground fight against the enemy should be focused on the different tactical levels.

Another challenge is simplicity versus complexity. While the strategy during the Cold War was quite simple and generally kept at the strategic level, today the operational and higher tactical levels have to deal with it in more detail. One example is, the COM ISAF “Anaconda Strategy”, which was far from being simple, but necessary to be implemented across the AOO. This goes along with the organizational aspects. The structure of the German Field Army until 1990 was simple, and could be understood by every soldier. Is this still the case today? No it isn’t. In almost all our countries, we are constantly changing our organization and adapting it to emerging requirements, trying to increase our “performance level”, but we should also take into consideration the fact that it can create the illusion of progress while producing confusion, inefficiency, and demoralization. If we can no longer understand the increased complexity of our own organization, how can we apply Mission Command? Can this be done by increasing staff personnel at all levels, to better understand its complexity? Our more and more sophisticated tools allow us to dig into, and try to analyze problem sets, at a level of detail which makes it extremely difficult to keep focused, and the risk of distraction is increased. “Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex. It takes a touch of genius—and a lot of courage to move in the opposite direction [Albert Einstein]”. Shouldn’t we try a bit more to be a courageous genius?

Scarc resources are another significant challenge. Two decades of focusing on missions, such as, in Bosnia-Hercegovina or Afghanistan, have had significant negative consequences for the provision of sufficient and adequate equipment for CD missions. Pooling of scarce resources has been the consequence and this has violated Mission Command. A prerequisite for successfully applying Mission Command, is that higher commanders provide sufficient resources, to execute the mission. This is true for actual missions in theatre, but not always for the missions that required training at home, and definitely not for, continuing CD training at adequate levels. This will change in the coming years but we have lost a lot of time at higher levels by administering the different resource pools, and we have lost focus on what issues should be dealt with, and at which level. Commanders at all levels should have adequate resources during peacetime, in order to focus on training their units. During the training period, they should avoid spending unnecessary time acquiring resources, rather than spending time focusing on the actual training.

CONCLUSION

Mission Command is a powerful “non-lethal weapon” for a Commander, to support mission success, if the aforementioned principles, on how superiors and subordinates should behave and act, are applied, and the requirements listed above, are met to the highest possible degree. It can make life “easy” for a Commander, executing the mission with the subordinated unit, if the force is educated, trained and resourced so that they are capable of applying these principles. Thus, Mission Command allows a Commander time to focus her/his personal efforts on the really important issues that require attention so that her/his soldiers may benefit and the mission execution may be a success.
We are now living the days when the world is facing a constant change; moreover, the organizations, no matter if civilian or military, started to learn to adapt in order to improve and to be successful.

**SO. WHAT IS LEARNING ABOUT?**

Learning is acquiring new knowledge, and more importantly, represents the ability to apply that new gained knowledge in order to improve our performance. In an organizational context, learning supports us to become more effective, take account of our mistakes, and overcome them in the future, and even become more competitive. Additionally, in the light of a constantly and rapidly changing operational environment, our organization/Headquarters is learning how to adapt its organization, processes and procedures and how to improve, in order to achieve its goals and execute its mission.

**ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING**

Organizational Learning (OL), as per the theory, is a wide-ranging and cross-disciplinary field with influences from other disciplines like sociology, psychology, management, etc. While there is more than one definition of the concept, the organizational learning theory is commonly described as a process of improving, maintaining, preserving and sharing knowledge within and outside the organization. OL occurs as a result of experiences, of interaction between personnel and takes place through the process of identifying, analyzing and correcting mistakes. It is said we have learned from an experience when we make a change in our organizational behavior and/or performance.

The learning process doesn’t stop with the change of our behavior, or with our improved performance, but it goes beyond - towards the knowledge-sharing within our Communities of Interests, with our Allies and/or Partners.

Additionally, a positive learning mindset across our organization is extremely important, governing the success of real learning, sustaining our improvement and leading to achieving the goals and accomplishing our mission.

Organizational learning is broadly defined as a learning process involving the interaction of individuals and collective group, organizational, and inter-organizational levels of analysis that leads to goals achievement:

- **Individual** - as the smallest learning community - is the community of the Lessons Learned Staff Officers/Points of Contact (LLSO/LL PoC) as a single entity in the process. When skills are improved or new ideas are learnt, productivity and performance generally increase. In order to maximize the benefit of this individual learning to the organization, the LLSO/LL PoC who learns the new skill must share it with his/her colleagues, otherwise, that skill remains with him/her. If he/she moves to another job, the knowledge moves with them, and the organization is stuck in place.

- **Group** - groups, teams, section and/or branches can also learn new skills together. When people spend the majority of their time working in a team, they have the tendency to coordinate in such a way that they will learn as a group.

- **Organizational** - represented by the entire Lessons Learned capability (leadership, mindset, structure/actors, process, tools, training and information sharing). It is a workable and sustainable process of gaining knowledge related to its function and using that knowledge to adapt to a changing operational environment in order to increase efficiency and/or gain success.

- **Inter-organizational** - the broadest type of organizational learning - it is based mostly on the information sharing within the entire NATO community (Allies, Partners and/or others), and it is represented by the opportunity to learn from others outside our organization.

**HOW DO WE DO IT?**

The purpose of the LL process is to learn efficiently from experiences and to provide validated justifications for amending the existing way of doing things, our organization, policies, procedures, rules and regulations, in order to improve our performance not only during operations, but also for our daily routine. This emphasizes the need for a rapid resolution for lessons, and for a good analysis, only leading to change if really necessary, and for the benefit of future activities.

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1. One of the most influential concepts in the organizational learning theory is the notion that we learn from our mistakes/errors. The idea was developed by Chris Argyris and Donald Schön.

2. #ElevenNationsOneTeam
Therefore, true organizational learning is driven by our leaders, Commander, Chief of Staff, Deputy Chiefs of Staff and Acting Chiefs of Staff that are involved in prioritizing lessons, assigning and tracking remedial actions, following up to ensure all the actors have actually learned, and being the driving force for information-sharing. Leadership guidance and engagement is evidenced through prioritizing issues, endorsing, resourcing, tasking actions, developing countermeasures.

Three steps have been identified for leadership in promoting the organizational learning:

- **Creating knowledge** - The first step towards learning is creating, or taking in, knowledge and information, by training all the organizational actors, by performing analysis, conducting surveys, networking with other HQs or studying Best Practices.

- **Maintaining knowledge** - Once the knowledge has been obtained, there is a need for a system to maintain it within the organization by recording, indexing or storing the databases in a place accessible to all in the future (platforms, portals, etc.).

- **Sharing the knowledge (information-sharing)** - the knowledge is transferred out of the individual community and into the organizational community as a whole, by conducting centralized training sessions, working groups, briefings and plenary, including enhancing internal review mechanisms like Command Group feedback on staff work.

**GOING STRATEGIC!**

The organization as a whole needs to learn and adapt for long term success, no matter how success is defined. For organizational learning to be implemented effectively, it is important to take a strategic, multi-pronged approach that evolves towards changing the organizational learning needs, adapted to the internal/external challenges. Organizational learning has to be a formally supported strategy, but also an integral part of the organization’s culture and climate/environment. The learning strategy recognizes both personnel’s individual needs and the HQ’s needs in terms of strengths and opportunities. A proper alignment with the overall strategy is critical in order to promote strong and sustainable organizational learning.

As the current operational environment is fast-paced, demanding and constantly evolving/changing, all the organizational actors need the skills to face these ever-evolving situations, so their development should not be left to chance. A good organizational learning strategy incorporates not only key leaders’ training, as their skills to be continually sharpened, but also new training opportunities and possibilities for their subordinates (including mentoring as a training possibility), in the search for new ways to adapt to this changing environment. In this way, personnel skills and satisfaction are boosted, enhancing their capacity to achieve the objectives.

Some considerations for a clear and effective organizational learning strategy should include, but are not limited to:

- **Alignment with entire organization’s mission (including prioritized goals):** - the Learning strategy is to be coordinated, fully synchronized and anchored with the HQ’s long-term/operational mission.

- **Raise Awareness** - raising staff awareness comprises activities that lead to an improvement in awareness of the CG’s intent, new policies, directives and initiatives.

- **Wise use of resources** - Includes all the required resources to be used in the OL strategy in order to create an effective training package, as well as leadership development sessions. On-site mobile training teams may have better gains and offer advantages such as team building and speed of course delivery.

- **Internal Stakeholder Assessment and Feedback** - includes all the internal review mechanisms as well as CG feedback on staff work, including mentoring and advising.

- **Learning Tools and Techniques** - the LL process is executed in order to deliver improvements and provides a structured framework with clear division of roles and responsibilities throughout the whole process, including analysis techniques, guided case study analysis, etc.

- **Future Requirements** - the organizational learning has to be built and adapted in accordance with the staff learning needs and training tools and resources as they evolve in this environment.

**ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING / LL CAPABILITY**

- **LEADERSHIP**
  - Leaders committed to organizational learning
  - Clear vision and goals
  - Provide guidance
  - Mentors and role models

- **LEARNING CULTURE - MINDSET**
  - Commitment to the results

- **INFORMATION SHARING**
  - Sharing is learning from others
  - Improve our own performance
  - Networking and coordination
  - Communities of Interest

- **LL PROCESS**
  - LL process embedded in daily work
  - LL focus areas
  - LL structure - roles and responsibilities
  - Tools

To re-iterate, the main idea is that everyone in the organization has the responsibility for learning, needs to understand its value and, in order to achieve our goals, to successfully accomplish our mission we need to keep on learning! Following a different path, we might lose many important resources (time, money, training, expertise and experts) or we might even get “lost in the environment of tomorrow.”
The HQ NRDC-ESP in the NATO's 70th Anniversary
HQ NRDC-ESP Manning for the Role as JTF HQ: Challenges

Colonel César Álvarez Abós (ESP-A)
ACOS G1 PERS

HQ NRDC-ESP has to be ready to fulfil operational missions playing several roles, namely as a Land HQ (Corps, Land Component Command, and NRF/LCC), and as a Joint Task Force (Land) HQ (JTF (L) HQ).

This article will try to explain the challenges of manning HQ NRDC-ESP for the role of JTF (L) HQ focusing on the point of view of G1 PERS branch.

Throughout this year (2019), HQ NRDC-ESP has successfully followed a process of certification as a JTF (L) HQ. Therefore, the topic seems timely and opportune.

The first challenge to face is to get the appropriate structure for the specific operation or exercise and accordingly define the resulting table of positions. The second challenge is to identify, train if needed, and appoint suitable and proficient personnel for each slot in the defined table of positions.

The third and last challenge is to get the appointed personnel to join the operation or exercise in time, and ready to carry out the operation/exercise, as well as for each of the subsequent rotations that could be set.

These challenges are to be tackled by several branches and the results eventually approved by the Commander (COM). However, G1 PERS will be involved in all three of them and will lead the second and the third challenges.

Before getting into each challenge’s details, it is necessary to explain that HQ NRDC-ESP has permanent manning structures for both the Land HQ and for the JTF (L) HQ roles, agreed upon and revised on a yearly basis by all the contributing nations (CN). Both structures share a number of peace establishment (PE) positions that are manned permanently and upon which each operational structure grows by adding specific Essential Augmentees (EA) and Non-essential Augmentees (NEA) positions. That is, EA and NEA positions are not the same for the LCC HQ and the JTF (L) HQ roles, although some of them can mirror each other. Each of these positions is clearly defined by means of the HQ role, code, duty title, rank, job description, etc. Additionally, PE and some of the EA positions have an associated contributing nation (CN) that has committed to fill them.

The main differences between EA and NEA positions are that the personnel appointed for the former are to join the HQ - when activated - in a shorter period of time, whereas the latter are positions mostly intended to man a more demanding shift system, as well as to reinforce or provide new capabilities to the HQ.

FIRST CHALLENGE

This permanent PE, EA and NEA manning scheme is designed based on the capabilities to be achieved by the HQ in each role for a standard operation. Therefore, when it comes to a specific operation/exercise, the scheme and table of positions are not necessarily going to fulfil the capabilities needed and so the first challenge appears.

All the HQ NRDC-ESP elements, from the branches up, are to assess the capabilities needed, define the positions to fulfil them and send their proposals to their upper level of command for the COM to eventually approve. Although this process is based on the permanent scheme, it has to be tailored to the specific operation/exercise, either by doing without some capabilities/positions and/or by adding supplementary ones. Among the latter, we are likely to find supplementary functional support in specific capabilities (EW, Intel, CIS, Cyber, joint logistics, and other joint related capabilities), military personnel to reinforce certain capabilities, and civilian Subject Matter Experts (SME) recruited from military voluntary reservists, officials in other ESP government ministries, or university expert personnel.

In comparison to the role of Land HQ, the role of JTF (L) HQ requires HQ NRDC-ESP to strengthen or to provide a number of joint related and reach back capabilities. All these standard joint related capabilities are included in the permanent JTF (L) HQ structure and the corresponding table of positions, but may also need tailoring for the specific operation/exercise. In the case of an exercise, the need for joint related positions is even greater because some of the LOCON response cells will play the part of Air, Maritime, Special Operations, etc. Component Commands, as well as other units providing capabilities not included in the Land HQ role.

Furthermore, HQ NRDC-ESP has revised its Command and Control and Command Post (C2CP) concept in order to increase survivability, resilience and reach back capabilities, as well as reduce the logistic footprint. The result has been smaller command posts that optimise personnel and therefore require a smaller table of positions in general and fewer augmentees in particular.
SECOND CHALLENGE

Once the operational structure and table of positions is set and approved, it is time for G1 PERS to lead the second challenge, that is to identify, train if needed, and appoint suitable and proficient personnel for each slot in that table of positions. Training falls within the scope of G7 TRG&EXER, but the rest is mostly a G1 PERS task carried out with the support of and in close coordination with the rest of the branches.

As we mentioned above, in comparison to the Land HQ role, the role of JTF (L) HQ demands HQ NRDC-ESP to strengthen or provide joint related capabilities that entail positions that require proficiency in joint areas of expertise. Therefore, the scope of organisations for G1 to look for proficient personnel, necessarily has to widen.

For this search, different groups of positions require distinct approaches. Let us outline them.

All the positions that mirror PE ones should be permanently manned with suitable personnel by the corresponding CN. Should any of these positions be vacant, G1 PERS will work with the ESP-Army Personnel Directorate and/or the Senior National Representatives (SNR) to get them filled in time for the operation/exercise.

Regarding positions that mirror EA ones allocated to the CN, there are personnel permanently nominated as EA and on call. Therefore, it is a matter for G1 through ESP-A Staff or SNR to activate those EA needed to join the operation/exercise in a timely manner.

As far as the rest of the EA, NEA and supplementary positions in the operational table of positions are concerned, they are offered to, and requested to be filled by whatever organisation is believed to have the proficient personnel. HQ NRDC-ESP, through G1 mainly, will reach out to the ESP Armed Forces organisations via the ESP-Army General Staff, to NATO elements such as SHAPE, NATO Command Structure (NCS) HQs and organisations, and NATO Force Structure (NFS) HQs; to military voluntary reservists; and, especially in the search for SME, even to other ministries of the Spanish government, universities, and other civilian institutions.

Moreover, at the operational level, and as operational environments get more complex, the need of different SMEs as Commander’s advisors (legal, political, gender, social media, etc.) and as experts in new capabilities (cyber) has increased. Therefore, the range of institutions to resort to has widened accordingly. This trend is likely to continue.

A Manning conference can be held, if necessary, before the operation or as part of each exercise Main Planning Conference (MPC) at which nations and other organisations must be able to confirm the positions they are willing and prepared to fill.

Once suitable and proficient personnel have been identified and appointed, G1 PERS will inform every branch of the augmentees and supplementary personnel assigned to them, and it is time to move on to the third challenge.

THIRD CHALLENGE

As we mentioned above, this third challenge is about getting the appointed personnel to join the operation or exercise in time, and ready to carry out their duties in the assigned position.

First, it entails G1 PERS sending all the augmentees and supplementary personnel the information they need to participate in the operation/exercise: their job descriptions, travel and accommodation arrangements, training activities, the personal equipment they will have to bring along, and out dates and conditions, how and when the in-processing will be carried out, etc.

Second, G1 PERS will request them to send, or bring to the exercise/operation some required documents, such as the corresponding NATO Security Clearance, medical certificate, vaccination card, deployability certificate, etc. Individuals are also given the points of contact for any questions or needs they may have. The information sent and the request for documents are usually included in a calling letter/message drafted in close coordination with Real Life Support (RLS), G7 TRN&EXER, G4 LOG and G2 INTEL. This letter will be sent to all organisations providing augmentees or supplementary personnel so that they forward the letter to the individuals joining the operation/exercise. This letter will prompt an exchange of information between the participants and G1 in general and with the branch of assignment in particular.

Each branch will designate a person of contact (POC) to deal with branch-specific issues such as supplementary training, and will provide its augmentees with any other non-classified information they may need prior to the deployment.
THE END OF THE CHALLENGES OR THE BEGINNING OF A CYCLE

In case of a long-lasting operation, this sequence of challenges turns into a cycle, each one beginning by reviewing the table of positions needed and ending with the personnel required for the next rotation joining the operation.

LESSONS LEARNED

Over previous manning processes, one of the lessons learned has been resorting to ESP Armed Forces voluntary reservists as a source of SMEs. As these personnel have diverse backgrounds and jobs, they make a pool of possible experts in a wide range of fields. So far, voluntary reservists have joined out JTF HQ as part of the POLAD, LEGAD, STRATCOM and meteo cells.

SUMMARY

The characteristics of the specific operation/exercise dictate the JTF HQ structure needed and the positions to be filled.

As JTF HQ, the need and participation of liaison elements from the participating non-Land component commands – Air, Maritime, and Special Operations – are paramount as they are the elements who mainly give HQ NRDC-ESP the status of a JTF HQ.

In addition, as the operational level environments get more complex, the range of both experts and organisations where they can be found broadens.

Whatever the origin of the personnel recruited, it is key to properly train and integrate them in the respective cells, as well as in the “JTF HQ team” as a whole.

In any case, these three challenges are to be addressed for the JTF HQ role played by HQ NRDC-ESP in every operation or exercise and, considering the number of personnel, contributing nations and external organisations involved, they are never easy to face, with G1 PERS bearing the brunt of the workload and responsibility.
TRIDENT JACKAL 2019: Deployment to MENORCA

Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Melián Navarro (ESP-A) G4 LOG MOV/TPT
Major Salvador Ribes Martínez (ESP-A) G4 LOG MOV/TPT ADAMS/EVE OPR

TRJA 19 was conducted as a CPX exercise and had several aims. One of them was to train, once again, the HQ sea and air deployment capacity. It was conducted on MENORCA island and STAVANGER (NOR) from 23 September (Battle Staff Training startex) to 06 October (ENDING) of 2019.

This article explains some important topics of the real deployment to MENORCA and STAVANGER.

It is important to note that exercise TRJA-19 Primary Training Audience changed from ARRC to NRDC-ESP last November 2018. Until that moment, NRDC-ESP was planning for taking on the JTF role from 2021, right after the ARRC standby period. NRDC-ESP took over the responsibilities of the ARRC participation in the TRJA19 exercise with very little time for planning.

This late change of the NRDC-ESP responsibilities on the exercise had an impact on the transportation planning, especially in terms of HNS transportation budget estimations for 2019, which had been developed without counting on this activity. To be more precise, no specific planning for such a deployment was conducted before that time, in terms of budget. This affected the capability to use the Host Nation permanent transportation contracts to provide freight forwarding for all maritime, air and road modes of transport, in particular for the demanding transportation requirements envisioned. In addition, the ESP ARMY freight vessels “Camino Español” and “Martin Posadillo” were not available for this venture for different reasons. All these constraints would be mitigated by using alternative procedures.

According to the Exercise Specification (EXPEC), the Exercise Objective 3 (EO3) for the Execution Phase included planning (real) the JTF HQ and the JLSG HQ. Also in the same document, the specific instructions about the deployment requirements stated that “The NFS JTF HQ and its associated JLSG HQ will operate in Spain (preferably outside the barracks).” So, according to this requirement, the certification exercise for PHASE III (execution), could be anywhere in Spain, it was not even compulsory to deploy out of the base.

After analysing different options, it was decided to deploy in MENORCA. From a logistic point of view, it was a difficult challenge, but on the other hand it was the best opportunity to test the deployment capabilities of NRDC-ESP HQ.

G4 was the branch responsible to plan the movement and transportation activities related to the deployment to MENORCA, in close coordination with G8, who led and managed all the contracting issues related with the deployment.

It was not the first deployment to MENORCA, but the situation now was different from previous deployments, as mentioned: no support from the prearranged contracts for the ESP ARMY forced NRDC-ESP to plan all deployment without external support, by directly contracting the transportation arrangements using the NATO funds available for the exercise. The bulk of general transportation support was provided by contracting outside resources.

The mission of establishing both the JTF and JLSG CPs on Menorca Island, included the need to plan the complete HQ Group, in particular: both JTF and JLSG HQ, the HQ Support Bn, MP Bn, Signal Unit, Geographical Support Unit and Guardia Civil Unit. In addition, the main EXCON was deployed to the HQ JWC in STAVANGER (NOR), together with the Signal Unit detachment providing CIS connectivity.

On the other hand, the NATO CIS connectivity to the JTF HQ and JLSG was established through the DPOP (Deployable Point of Presence) deployed from their Home Base to MENORCA.

The deployment movements started on Aug 31st and the redeployment of the last element was on October 21st. To be more accurate, the container haulage to the Port started some days prior to the 31st Aug and finished some days after the 21st October.

In terms of figures, the deployment from Valencia to Menorca Island was comprised of 760 pax, 110 vehicles and 140 containers (all of them belonging to the HQ Group). Apart from these figures, 70 pax belonging to the EXCON and EVAL Team were deployed to MENORCA from different NATO entities; and finally, DPOP also deployed 30 pax, 12 vehicles and 2 containers in MENORCA.

Additionally, the NRDC-ESP contribution to EXCON was deployed to the JWC HQ located in STAVANGER (NOR). The cargo was moved by road and the personnel by air using different airports and civilian airlines. In terms of figures, this movement comprised 99 pax (including the EXCON and the Sig Bde Detachment) and 2 vehicles and 2 containers belonging to the SIG BDE.
The general rule was to use maritime MOT (mode of transportation) for cargo and air MOT for personnel.

If we look to the timelines, we can conclude that we optimised the time for deployment/redeployment and setting up the HQ, compared with the previous ones.

In addition, proper planning and execution documents covering real-life support issues for deployment were produced and delivered in order to let the units and staff understand how deployment would take place.

Last, we have to mention that the support received from all military and civilian personnel involved in our deployment to Menorca was fully cooperative.

To conclude, without any doubt, TRAJ19 provided the knowledge and capability of self-contracting and self-deployment; this HQ is ready to deploy in a real operation with minimum external support.
The Logistic Part of a Common Operational Picture

Lieutenant Colonel Benito Maus García (ESP-A)
RSC JLOC Chief

NATO operations have essentially changed the need for sharing information between the different levels of command. Therefore, relevant, timely, and correct knowledge of the joint situation, including its logistics aspects, are a pre-requisite for planning and conducting military operations. This requires the capability to collect, process, analyse, and exchange logistics data, as well as suitable tools to manage all of it. The Common Operational Picture (COP), one of the tools currently used to fulfill these requirements, addresses the Operational Level and above, while at the Tactical Level, the term Recognized Picture (RP) is used.

Besides, sharing information with NATO partners is critical when operating in a multinational environment. Building a common operational picture, including a logistics part, with NATO allies is essential for teamwork and strong cooperation. Planning and executing logistics operations requires interoperable accessibility to digital systems that permit information sharing.

The COP enables NATO Commanders and other forces to share common views of a mission in order to improve situational awareness (SA), enhance coordination, de-conflict planning, and support the decision-making process, contributing to conducting the situation with the required effectiveness and efficiency. For this purpose, it provides a single framework that is essential for effective and efficient logistics support (visibility on requirements, shortfalls, resources, capabilities, and procedures).

The logistic part of a COP is used by subordinate units to visualize and assess the effects of sustainment and movements. This part also provides a context that commanders can use to describe and direct future operations, synchronizes requirements with capabilities over time, and provides a single framework that represents the current situation. The logistic data can be used to identify future gaps, shortfalls, or assess any capability within the joint logistics support network. It goes without saying that the logistic elements, including its logistics part, is essential for the effective, sustained COP that must focus on efforts and supplies over time. A decision-making process requires time to make conclusions and deliver support.

The NATO Recognized Logistics Picture (RLP) provides the logistic part for COP to enable NATO-led forces to share a common and tailored view of the logistics situation at a tactical level, supporting a common understanding. The RLP is a synchronised, distributed common set of validated logistics-relevant data. The RLP makes all this data available, close to real-time, determining each level of command, the depiction of the data needed to visualize the situation, make assessments and manage operations. However, it is not as simple as collecting data and providing it to the commander. The data has to be analysed in a timely manner with the most accurate information. This assessment makes it possible to determine capabilities, forecast logistics requirements, and synchronize logistics movements. Besides, it is also important that all levels of command, understand what information from the logistics elements, is needed to provide the appropriate assessment to higher levels.

Upper echelons must identify the required RLP elements and give directions to fill it. The RLP should include a logistic update of status and activities, a movement situation report, a terrain-oriented visual depiction of logistics entities and the relevant data for the tailored mission. Additionally, allowing for unexpected events, the RLP should provide a report of decision-making and problem-solving results. Future activities may require additional planning and should have points based on the sustainment situation and plans. It is also important for the commander to see what is happening in order to understand how current operations will affect plans. Once those elements are identified, orders should provide criteria for obtaining the information about the capabilities and critical supplies.

On the other hand, too much reliance on digital products can be a downfall when a system fails or power is lost, or when a system suffers a cyber-attack or other event. Using analog products (rather than digital ones) to back-up digital products, is critical to the continued success of a sustainment organization in the event of a system going down.

Finally, this assessment should be carried out in a way that is clearly understood at all levels (presentations, graphs, charts, etc.). Therefore, in order to make the logistics part of the COP effective, staff at different levels, should understand how information is visualized by the commander.

![Figure. A way to visualize relevant information more effectively.](image-url)
“There is nothing new under the sun” is probably an overused cliché, but when it comes to the military, perhaps it would be more correct to say “there are not many military ideas that are ABSOLUTELY new.”

On September 11th the keynote document of the new version of NATO’s Joint Doctrine for MED SPT (JDP-4.10) was approved by the Alliance’s member nations. The previous edition was recorded in STANAG 2228, on May 28th, 2015 (Ed. B, V. I). The updated doctrinal document (Ed. C, V. I) contains some modifications, mainly related to structure and classification of subjects, and chapters. It also includes more technical Annexes.

Some denominations are changed, or replaced by others. For instance, MEDICAL FACILITY was the preferred denomination for one Medical post with a group of assets, means and personnel, providing a service with clearly-defined limits. Previously the concept of a MED element was defined as a physical entity. Now these concepts are denominated MED CAPABILITIES, emphasizing the tasks that each individual medical group can accomplish. Although both terms are not equivalent and the concepts defined are not exactly the same, in the planning process, and in current practice, MED CAPABILITY will probably be used instead of FACILITY. This is because it is considered to be a more appropriate name for full implementation of the modular structure described in Ed C-1.

The new doctrine defines a more integrated MED structure, which joins related issues together into a more functional knowledge-based tool. The previous version (B-1) was probably more practical for planning and solving conceptual doubts and discussion during OPP (if that was not the case, perhaps we worked with this document for too long). Ed. C-1 describes a slightly changed structure of J-MED which includes a new Medical Logistic capacity (it is going to be implemented in other HQs). MEDINT is included in FHP. Although PECC (Personnel Evacuation and Coordination Cell) is defined now, they are really scarce. Now the relationships between JTF, MEDDIR and JLSG MEDDAD are clearly defined.

However, apart from these and other apparently significant changes, does this new version really introduce many changes, different principles or concepts? Does this “new” document modify the conceptual core?

Many of the concepts and procedures are not changed. Key principles continue to be as they were defined in Ed. B-1 and developed in other Alliance documents. NATO MED SPT principles are unaltered and they continue to be a guideline of the Alliance MED philosophy. AJP-4.10 C-1 is more of an adaptation taking into account the new reality of incoming scenarios where NATO forces may deploy and develop their actions. Previous concepts and ideas are analyzed from an updated perspective, adapted to new realities and revised following the most recent "Lessons learnt" operations process.

**FUNDAMENTALS OF MEDICAL SUPPORT**

Both Strategic and Operational contexts are considered. The former is a very complex and global scenario drawn from a vulnerable balance of dependences where new threats, including population health risks, will further shape the future security environment. Although NATO objectives and aims remain the same, the Alliance should be ready to face these new challenges, responding to different medical support requirements, but remaining loyal to its old, strong and respectful position regarding human rights principles.

The latter, the Operational side, is seen as a challenge, which will be faced by NATO when it deploys potentially dynamic measures of a flexible and adaptable MED SPT Joint Structure capable of responding to different, increasing and unexpected requirements, where there are less resources available and there is no hope of medical help from external counterparts. NATO MED has to be prepared to be involved in CIV-MIL actions in the most demanding situations. This includes substituting and helping JOA civilian medical structures, in order to avoid a greater deterioration of the civilian population health conditions and a conditioning of medical crisis operations which may become a direct threat to NATO’s own forces. This situation should always be in accord with local authorities, and would probably be coordinated by UN OCHA.

**LAND OPERATIONS**

The remaining concepts are those of maximum adaptability, readiness, sufficient capability and flexibility. All of these make it possible to provide support in any area and in a variety of different areas of deployment. In these areas there is more and more dependence on longer communication lines, which are more dispersed and can easily be interrupted. Medical facilities, capabilities and capacities must be ready to change position at very short notice, and will also require an autonomous casualty sustainment capacity over prolonged periods, because Aero-MEDEVAC should not be thought of as a guarantee, because Air superiority cannot be ensured, when significant threats are identified and the rescue of MEDEVAC assets is required. A safe environment for MTFs will not always be available, either for IN or NGO Medical care for the population in high risk environments. This means that most MTFs in affected areas can become overburdened by high numbers of local (mainly civilian) casualties.
From the very early stages of OPP it is important to have a significant surplus of MED resources, higher than those strictly required by the NATO forces. All this process makes MTF’s target areas, even more vulnerable and more likely to be targets for hybrid and terrorist attacks. They, along with other MED assets, require more complete protection by combat units.

The new document covers different, larger, more hostile and highly variable land operation scenarios; and agile and dynamic positioning with enhancement of Medical Capabilities. It will be necessary to address clinical and operational needs and ensure that there is an appropriate medical footprint to support the dispersed populations at risk.

The Modular MTF system is going to be increased and reinforced. Standard modules with different capabilities will continue to be the interchangeable bricks for building any MTFs, but now all their capabilities have to be integrated into the appropriate modules. These continue as core modules (basic functions assigned to each MTF) and complement each other in order to reinforce modules. A system of modular-based MTFs must be able to provide immediate essential core capabilities as close as possible (at least temporarily) to the Force.

**JOINT AIR OPERATIONS**

MED SPT has to reflect the complex technical and highly constrained intricacies of military aviation and medicine. Threats from longer distances, and difficulties experienced by rescue flight crews, need to be supported by MTFs from other command components and have a greater dependence on Aero MEDEVAC assets.

**JOINT MARITIME OPERATIONS SPECIFIC CHALLENGES**

Maritime areas of operation are often very large, with different legal statuses, and separated by great distances. Units with limited medical personnel continue to be at risk of being far away when overextended medical timelines are in operation. Mobility might disrupt the continuum of care and established MEDEVAC lines. Ships and MTF on board would be moving during maritime operations (platforms providing or requiring MED SPT).

The Maritime environment will often produce an enormous number of casualties in different situations. It is therefore important to take into consideration the difficulties involved in receiving immediate and appropriate treatments and MEDEVAC assets (by air or by sea).

All of these threats are restrictions for MCC MED assets. This needs to be considered in a common collaborative joint MED SPT structure in the planning process. Of course, MCC MED Assets can be an important initial phase resource when providing support to any Joint Force during the first stages of entrance to the AOO, deployment and RSOM. Especially dedicated MED ships would be very useful in this first period.

**SPECIAL OPERATIONS**

MED SPT for Special Operations Forces (SFP) must address the most serious threats without diminishing SFP operational principles and requirements. SFP uses conventional medical support capabilities where it is available and required. They provide emergency medicine. This covers a very broad spectrum. MED personnel have to be capable of operating, moving and communicating with the supported troops. Self-technologies are very common and useful, but require senior MED leadership involvement.

SFP assets should not be integrated into a common Joint MED Structure. They are useful only for their main task which is not considered to be a possible source for other Forces, although joint MED SPT assets support those of SFP.

**JOINT THEATRE SUPPORT OPERATIONS**

JLSC direct and supervise the RSOM process of deploying forces via all available disembarkation points and facilities. JLSC has its own MEDAD who direct and guide early MED deployments and retain control of MTF who are assigned to support the early phases, and have the MEDICAL responsibility of the rear area assigned to JLSC. MEDAD is in close contact with, and collaborates with JTF MEDDIR. JLSC MEDAD also directs the MED SPT during the redeployment phase.

Example of a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Medical support structure.

**PRINCIPLES, POLICIES AND STANDARDS OF MED SPT**

**PROTECTION OF MED CAPABILITIES**

NATO continues to be always in accord with the Laws of Armed Conflicts and International Humanitarian Law. MED assets, capabilities, capacities and personnel are protected and cannot be targeted by hostile actions. If NATO MED protected status capabilities are not respected, commanders can authorize the masking of protective emblems and order their protection.

**ELIGIBILITY OF RELATED PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES (MED ROE, RULES OF ELIGIBILITY)**

TCNs MED ROEs will be harmonized with those of OPS COM to ensure that the local engagement of NATO health care providers is IAW operations requirements and the objectives of the Alliance.
THE THEATRE PATIENT RETURN POLICY

This concept has been changed slightly. Also its name has changed. Previously it was called “Theatre Holding Police”.

MEDICAL CARE OF PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY

As stated in the NATO principles and ethics, these people will receive a MED care consistent with LoAC, IHL and HN Laws. They have to be treated, evacuated and discharged, using the same criteria as applied to the capturing nation’s own personnel.

MEDICAL CARE FOR NON-COMBATANT PATIENTS

This is still a Command decision, although in the case of acute life-threatening conditions, emergency care should not be denied within the capability/capacity of the deployed medical resources. Even CIV-MIL MED SPT cooperation is not a primary operational function. This subject is again repeated and developed over several pages, marking it as one of the NATO MED policies most frequently applied. This demonstrates that Mil MED Services are exceptionally useful in accomplishing some of the most difficult objectives required by NATO.

THE MODULAR APPROACH TO MED SPT

This is now a reinforced conceptual idea which makes it possible to enhance the efficiency and adaptability of MED SPT. This concept is developed in a more detailed and extended section. Modular structure becomes the complete panorama of MED SPT, being reinforced and implemented alongside all MED treatment Chains. This makes it possible to adapt the size and capabilities/capacities of MED SPT not only to each different mission/operation, but also to different phases and it also makes it possible to modify the deployment with only minor changes and to react to each course of action, and be able to deal with each incident requiring a specifically reinforced MED Capability in a determinate place and time.

MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY OF STRATEGICAL COMMAND

NATO Strategic Commands, Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ATO) remain responsible for Joint and combined MED Concepts and doctrine, Force Health Protection and MED Communication and INFO Systems. These tasks continue to be developed by SHAPE J-MED. This represents SACEUR’s medical interests across the breadth of NATO and conducts appropriate liaison with non-NATO organizations.

NATO PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL SUPPORT

As before, MED SPT will be provided in compliance with humanitarian, ethical and legal standards as defined by LoAC/LOW (IHL) and the Oslo Guidelines by the UN Office for the OCHA. It will also comply with the respective national regulations for both the military and clinical professions. Medical confidentiality is to be ensured.

MED SPT should be based on cooperation of all parties involved, and there should be full compatibility. MED Forces should be as well prepared, equipped, trained, and ready for deployment as the forces they support. MED SPT still comes under Clinical needs and it should always strive to achieve a standard of care in accordance with best medical practice. Timelines of treatment continue as before AND should be enforced according to clinical evidence.

NATO PRINCIPLES OF MED CARE TO PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY

Their health and integrity should not be endangered anytime or anywhere. Their state of health should be examined by medical personnel as soon as possible and thereafter at least once a month. All that is required to keep them in good health will be provided. MED procedures, not indicated by the patient’s state of health, (particularly experiments) are strictly forbidden.

NATO PRINCIPLES FOR THE MODULAR APPROACH TO MED SPT

This point was developed significantly, and is one of the key updates in the new C-1 Edition. The modular approach builds on capability modules, each having a capability-specific standard functionality and output. Each module represents a functional capability which cannot be split, but personnel, training, equipment and supplies from different providers, nations and organizations, can be combined to create a collective functional unit. Modules must be able to work cooperatively in agreement with other modules irrespective of their origin and ensure that there is compatibility with equipment & supplies, communication and information technology, and a power and water supply from other providers. Personnel from modules assigned to a Medical Unit must be able to effectively integrate, overcome language barriers and cultural differences and operate with equipment and supplies from other modules and providers.

The type and number of modules must be selected on the basis of requirements, mission characteristics and risks. They should be adjustable to tactical and operational situations, in order to form or enhance a medical capability. Modules/contributions can be combined from medical assets, facilities or Units in different configurations. They can be both structurally and capability-based.

For each medical capability, a standard set of modules defines the minimum capability requirements. All modules can be used to augment, enhance or to complement it according to mission needs and operational requirements. Dependencies between modules must be considered. Specific modules cannot be deployed from a medical Unit without adverse impact on other modules. Limitations (technical as well as professional, legal, political or operational) must be clearly defined before the module is assigned to a medical unit.
CONCLUSIONS

The new Edition of the APJ-4.10 (Edition C-1, September 11th, 2019) is a much shortened version of the previous one. It has been structured with three chapters, one for each approach to MED doctrine (fundamentals, principles and organization and tasks) and additional technical annexes.

This key document was produced to give a general picture as most of the procedural details will appear in future publications. This gives it a longer life as a common referential document because the concepts stated and defined are mostly in accord with the same NATO principles. In the long term, only a few small changes will be necessary. Just a few procedures will need to be updated. Therefore this document will continue to be the main JOINT MED SPT doctrine for the foreseeable future.

Most of the previous concepts and procedures have been simplified, and it is still possible to adapt them to different environments and circumstances but they continue to follow the same clearly-defined principles.

Some new items have been introduced. They are, in fact, a deeper development of previous and unchanged concepts. However, at least one of them can define a “new” line of work... although it refers to practices from a long time ago (which are not clearly legal in some EU countries, including Spain).

The modular structure of new MEDICAL CAPABILITIES (but remaining MTFs) is more clearly defined leaving infinite possibilities for adaptation, even though this concept was developed in modern times after Korea and implemented as a realistic solution to any situation.

In accord with these modular capabilities, a new Role 2 MTF is defined, it is the Role 2 Forward (R2F) which is a new version of the previous Surgical Mobile Echelon which provides MED SPT to the deployment of RRF. However, the concept is old, originally defined by Marquis of La Mina in 1757, following his experiences in Austrian War of Succession and as Dragoons’ Commander in 1732.

A better-adapted and significant CIV-ML Medical cooperation (in fact Military MED element providing help, support and replacing destroyed and unreliable CIV MED structures) is defined with an increasingly important role in future operations. However this concept was developed during the Napoleonic Era. MEDLOG capability in HQ MTF branches are defined and are required, but it was their main task in the first instance, when they were included in G-4/3-4. MED- INTEL is not thoroughly developed but it is still a “new” (and ancient also) capability, sometimes not completely understood.

Perhaps the most controversial point would be to treat as acceptable the first line practices related to blood transfusions in situ, in emergency situations. This can give rise to concerns about the very serious health risks involved, and is not clearly in accord with all NATO TCNS laws. But of course, this is not a new practice. In fact it was a very ancient way of administering a blood transfusion to combat casualties in battle. Inevitably, it caused a lot of lethal accidents.

In conclusion, this new and really innovative document can be regarded as a doctrinal update that does not leave the former good principles behind, but even highlights some of the old and ancient medical military practices and ideas. Again when it comes to military matters, we can conclude that there is “nil novum sub Sole”
I’m sitting on the edge of the road waiting for the time to move again with my Signal Centre company convoy. Vehicles are scattered under the trees and crews are resting in silence. Lights and strong sounds are strictly prohibited. Everybody knows any fault will be promptly punished by the enemy, always waiting to profit from our errors. Suddenly, a sound approaches from the sky and everybody shrinks, lies down, and takes cover. It’s clearly the sound of an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) rotor. It could be ours, or an enemy one. Fortunately, the sound goes away and we can relax, thinking that this time the deadly load that those birds carry will fall upon another unlucky chap. The time to move arrives, and with a sort whistle I call for my radio operator and for my platoon leaders. The radio starts to purr and I call my G6 staff officer for instructions. I’m informed that the support and security infrastructure required to install the NRDC-ESP HQ Warfighting Corps Forward Command Post number two (FORWARD CP 2) is almost finished. So, we can move and join the Support Battalion HQ team to start installing the corresponding CIS network and equipment. Everybody looks at the map and I check where we have to go and which route we will use. Officers and senior NCOs nod in silence. I get up and whisper: Go! There was a time when we were able to use our GPS devices to help movement navigation. But the enemy quickly started to employ its capability to jam and spoof GPS and our confidence in those former useful tools disappeared after we got lost several times.

After a short half an hour driving, we arrive at a small village. We have a site layout CIS deployment plan for our equipment, and vehicles disperse looking for backyards, granaries or garages, under the supervision of the Military Police guys. I start to look for the FORWARD CP 2 site commander. After a couple of inquiries, I locate him inside the downstairs stage of a house. He shows me the internal layout of the CP, adapted to the layout of the village we are now deploying. Ok, I can start to deploy my computers and phones. The satellite At-the-Quick-Halt terminals have already established the satellite link trunks. I locate the cabling network platoon chief and provide him with an overview of the layout for CP users. We have our cabling CP layout templates, but each site we deploy is different, and we have to adapt the specific cabling plan. For security reasons, WiFi computer network access is not yet authorised, so we spend some time laying the cables of the network as quickly as possible. Meanwhile, the information system servers’ farm node is being started and initialised. We connect it with the satellite communications links and CIS services start to interoperate with other CIS nodes deployed in Theatre, mainly with our other Corps Command Posts: MAIN, FORWARD 1 and Reach-back; and also, with the Corps Divisions and Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) elements. Since we’re moving so fast from one place to another, some core information system services risk becoming corrupted. Our main information system infrastructure is based on Microsoft servers. They need to synchronise each other’s databases and this takes time. If we interrupt that synchronisation by disconnecting and connecting them too fast, we may risk getting them corrupted and we may need to reinstall the software from scratch and start the synchronisation again. I cross my fingers that this situation doesn’t happen; or, at least, not this time (we had to perform this painful re-installation some days ago).
We know that we, the Corps CPs, and the Signal Centres that support them, are critical command and control elements that the enemy wants to locate and destroy. Some of our CIS services rely on distributed software databases: that means that the information is replicated in several locations. If the database in one location is damaged, the information is not lost since it can be replicated from the databases in other locations. Our Land Command and Control information system is a distributed system: the Spanish SIMACET/Antares. But we are also reliant on CIS services that, by design, have a central information repository that cannot be distributed or replicated in several places. It is a single database located in a single place. Electronic Mail, TOPFAS, INTEL FS, LOGFAS, Microsoft (MS) SharePoint Web portals, and other NATO CIS services, depend on information loaded in single centralised databases. You may protect them with clustering technology, you can even prepare a back-up system to restore them if data is lost, but if you deploy those databases in Theatre, subject to direct enemy threats, and having to move them frequently, the risk of losing information, or having it unavailable, increases dramatically.

So, we have decided that centralised CIS services have to remain in servers grouped in a reach-back node located at home. You may bring this node in Theatre, but it ought to remain in a completely secure place, out of the risk of conventional combat. We have to assume that information on those centralised databases needs to be accessed remotely by the users deployed in Theatre. So far, our Corps MAIN CP and the two FORWARD CPs are not secure enough to host those precious central databases. They have to remain back in our reach-back node. Our main problem with the implementation of this solution is the bandwidth to manage user remote access from forward computers to rear servers and databases. Nowadays, we’re fighting in a conventional warfare, with no possibility of using civil contracts to improve our connectivity. Once we win, and will do it, we may start to profit from the remaining Theatre civil infrastructure capabilities to improve communications. But, meanwhile, how to manage dozens of users accessing remotely to far distant databases by using the limited satellite bandwidth we have?

To solve this problem, we have found several hasty solutions that, so far, are proving good enough. First, we have fielded a special compression software that has been prepared, to decrease the bandwidth requirements to access or replicate MS SharePoint web portal documentation and file repositories. Together with electronic mail, MS SharePoint web portal is the most used service since it serves to manage and display, in a Web portal manner, our Staff files. With this software, we can replicate those files back and forth, optimising our limited satellite links. With the electronic mail service, the situation is a bit more complex. Users’ mailboxes cannot be replicated and have to remain in a centralised mail server. We have decided to store user mailboxes in the reach-back node and make users access their mail by a web interface. Web mail interface limits the bandwidth requirements to access the mailboxes. We have established a policy to avoid file attachments in mails. Files have to be included in mail messages as web links. The real files are stored in the MS SharePoint web pages. Those files are recovered by clicking on the link inserted in the mail message and, thereafter the file can be downloaded, but this time, they are using the capabilities of the compression software we’ve installed and minimising the satellite bandwidth consumption. For other more complex centralised CIS services, solutions vary depending on the situation. Planning related services, like TOPFAS, are maintained just in the reach-back site. The web TOPFAS client does not run very well in current versions, so, remote access seems to be not an option. Once NATO releases the improved version, forward Staff may access TOPFAS rear databases using this web interface decreasing the bandwidth requirements.

I hear the sound of engines from a column arriving to the village. The profile of the Satellite-on-the-Move vehicle that supports the Commander’s Mobile Platform can be clearly distinguished, showing the round shape of the small satellite antenna on its top. This vehicle arrives at the village accompanied by the Commander’s personal car and other vehicles with Staff personnel, including DCOS OPS, the FORWARD CP 2 chief. They’ve come from the FORWARD CP 1 that now will begin to get dismantled as FORWARD CP 2 progressively takes over the conduct of Corps operations. Other NRDC-ESP HQ Staff, DCOSs, and the Deputy COM, remain in the MAIN CP, some kilometres behind us, not so close to the combat operations as the FORWARD CPs 1 and 2, but also subject to enemy deep operations attacks.

Illustration 3. At-the-Quick-Halt satellite terminal.

Illustration 4. An example solution to replicate SharePoint Web portals.
My CIS personnel is about to finish cabling and computers and VOIP handsets are installed on top of the tables which are abandoned and sitting on my own computer and check it, testing the performance of the core and basic CIS services. I immediately access the Signal Unit MS SharePoint webpage and check the new radio timetables, emergency radio net frequencies and call-signs, the predicted locations for the next CP deployments and any other information that will permit me to start planning for the next movement of the FORWARD CP 2.

I take notes on my notebook since I don’t know whether the enemy actions will permit me to access the information later using a computer. G6 OPS Staff Chief addresses me and asks if we’re ready. I think so, but we need some users to check their computers. Staff start to work on their computers. G6 reps browse around looking to see any problems. There are some issues, for sure, but it seems we are connected with our databases and services are running, replicating information. DCOS OPs checks with the Commander and FORWARD CP 2 takes over. Deputy COM on MAIN CP is informed and FORWARD CP 1 starts to dismantle. It is located at around 30 kilometres from the site of our FORWARD CP 2. My colleague there, the FORWARD CP 1 Signal Centre chief, will have to start thinking about moving to the next predicted position, after the respective support Battalion elements do. Fortunately, the movement path is increasing and this reflects how our Brigades and Divisions are penetrating deep in enemy territory. The quicker we move, the less vulnerable we are, and the deeper we are advancing inside the enemy disposition.

I take a short rest. I miss my family and friends but, since mobile phones are prohibited, I don’t know when I will be able to talk with them. Three dead and five wounded, two weeks ago, was the price my company had to pay in order to learn how dangerous using, or even carrying mobile phones is in this type of war. Some stupid soldier was hiding one and switched it on to talk to whoever - in two minutes the enemy detected, located and bombed its position. Lesson painfully learned. Well, I expect that, in a couple of hours, when CP is completely finished and services are stable, we may allow several classic phone terminals to be used for calling home according to a shift the HQ has established.

As Staff start to work with the computers, problems arise. Intel users complain to G6 Staff guys about being unable to access to INTEL FS database on the reach-back node. G6 Staff rep checks with me. Evidently, something is happening with that service. NATO CIS Agency (NCIA) has been designing Functional Area Services (FAS) thinking exclusively in the static peace situation of the NATO Command Structure HQs. They rely on Commercial-off-the-Shelf (COTS) products that are not prepared for handling the challenging and dynamic environments of this type of conventional warfare. We’ve been trying to convince NCIA that it seems necessary to think again about the FAS services and test them in challenging combat environments. Too late. We’re now testing them in a real situation and it’s not the best moment to change anything. In the end, the INTEL FS problem seems to be related with the available bandwidth to access the reach-back server and with the interface, with the local Map server. Our technicians in the FORWARD CP 1 are in contact with the reach-back node technical team where the most expert technical personnel are kept to manage remote administration and configuration of the complete network.

Deployed technicians have a minimum knowledge to carry out basic tasks, but when complex problems arise they then they have to remotely access the servers or computers and try to find the solutions. Those clever guys have checked that connection again, resolved the map server issue and recommended waiting for the system to stabilize before trying further access to the reach-back services. Meanwhile, Intel folks will have to employ alternative means to issue RFIs or Intel products. They have no complaints so far about another incident and complex Intel FAS, the Common Shared Database. This is a system of interconnected databases that, initially, have to replicate each other. We have our CSD on the MAIN CP, synchronised with the one that is located in the reach-back node. From the FORWARD CPs we are accessing it remotely, again, stressing the bandwidth provided by the satellite links. Thanks to the remote technical administration from the reach-back node, these types of complex services can be managed. The knowledge and expertise required to carry out that task is equivalent to that of a very experienced civil computer engineer. Once we find an officer or NCO with the potential to understand those complex technicalities, we spend money in training him. Normally, they remain at the reach-back site to cope with complex problems and solve them remotely, with the help of the less savvy administrators that have been deployed forward in Theatre, but that don’t have the level of expertise the reach-back technicians master.

But threats don’t just come from conventional kinetic weapons, or from EW devices: since we use computers, we are also subject to the threat of cyber-attacks. Our FORWARD CP node is protected because our services have been configured using secure policies and our FORWARD CP node is monitored using a Cyber-defence sensor that is constantly checking for abnormal network behaviours, and for adequate software patching and configuration. Our mission classified network is not connected to Internet, so the main threats don’t come from hackers or from viruses coming from Internet. Our main enemies are related with our own users and have clear names: USB storage devices, and hard copies of classified documents that have been printed from computer files. At the beginning of the conflict we noticed that the enemy had dropped from the air, in specific places like crossroads, USBs labelled with NATO flags. We suspected immediately that a USB that you find in the middle of a remote place with a NATO flag may not be secure. And we were right: those USBs were infected with a very powerful and sophisticated virus that intended to corrupt our computers and make them useless. We use a Data Leakage Prevention system to monitor what enters and exits from our intranet. Everything has to be controlled by the Terminal Area Security Officers (TASOs). Our second headache is users trying to print classified documents without properly registering and controlling them. As a result, we have decided to limit printers and implemented printing software that monitors printing jobs and guarantees accountability of all printing products.

Well, the CP starts to run. The Staff battle rhythm is working, some videoconferences have been run successfully and new and computer independent controlled. The sun rises, morning starts, and it’s time to sleep a few hours before the next move. I confer with my team, establish the team’s shifts and look for a place to rest. Tonight, we may have to start moving again.
AIR Operations Coordination Center (Land) (AOCC(L)) and Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) Roles

“Air Power is the ability to use air capabilities to influence the behavior of actors and the course of events” AJP-3.3

Lieutenant Colonel César A. Oliver Martorell (ESP-AF)
AOCC CAS/AI/EW

INTRODUCTION

In 1947 the US Air Force became a separate branch of the military. The Key West Agreement of 1948 further identified the service roles and missions of the Air Force. The Army and Air Force agreed to cooperate as a team on joint operations, with the Air Force providing airlift and CAS (Close Air Support) to the Army. The latter of which, CAS, generated tension between these two services. The US Army and Air Force differences concerning CAS began in WWII and continued into the Vietnam War. Disagreements between services included: type of aircrafts employed, time of response, and decentralization of Air Force command and control concept. For example, in the Vietnam War the US Air Force wanted all their assets operating under the Tactical Air Control System (TACS), while the US Army favored the use of organic Air Power assets under control of ground forces, in order to have a quick response time and support. This situation forced both services to generate new doctrine and implement new structures and procedures. The Air Support Operation Center (ASOC) became the TACS entity. It is normally collocated at the Division level and able to control Air Power assets operating within Army Area of Operations (AOO) and in direct support of land forces.

NATO doctrine is not always totally aligned with allies’ doctrinal publications. It is not difficult to find discrepancies in NATO doctrine when analyzing hierarchical documents. It is also evident that NATO doctrine is influenced considerably by US doctrine. And, it is also easy to understand that not all, if any, NATO countries have inter-services agreements, like the previously mentioned 1948 Key West agreement. Therefore, the relationship between services, the role of different air entities, and how CAS is foreseen, can vary.

“Unity of Command” and “Centralized Control and Decentralized Execution” are key Air Power principles easily recognized by all NATO Air Force. To exercise centralized C2, the Air Component has to implement a robust communication and data exchange architecture. This is the reason why the JFAC is normally so technologically dependent. Arguably, the JFAC is the most capable, feasible, and resilient entity that can plan, task and control air operations as well as being the lead entity for specific joint functions such as JPR or JIST and possibly JFIRES.

THE AIRSPACE CONTROL AUTHORITY

Generally speaking, the responsibilities of the COM JFAC are assigned by SACEUR and/or COM JTF and may include, but are not limited to, performing the duties of the Airspace Control Authority (ACA) and the Air and Missile Defence Commander (AMDC).

The ACA is the commander designed to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system which includes production of an Airspace Control Plan (ACP) and a daily Airspace Control Order (ACO). These products organize the airspace “promoting the ability of air, land and maritime forces to operate in an efficient, integrated, and flexible manner with minimum mutual interference and without undue restraint and risk to friendly forces and neutral aircraft”.

As previously mentioned, air operations are controlled through an overarching C2 communications and CIS structure centered in the JFAC. Part of this structure includes ARS/DARS, AEW/AWACS, CRCs, WOCs, BOCs, AOCCs or TACPs. In conclusion, the JFAC organizes the C2 system attending the assigned mission by SACEUR/COM JTF.

AIR OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTER LAND

A NATO AOCC(L) is a tactical level air entity collocated with, though not subordinated to a GRF(L) HQ. In peacetime, the AOCC(L) is functionally subordinated to HQ AIRCOM, while, during exercises and operations, the AOCC(L) is functionally subordinated to the designated JFAC HQ.

2 JFIRES concept is not fully developed in NATO.
3 AJP-3.3 ALLIED JOINT DOCTRINE FOR AIR AND SPACE OPERATIONS. Edition B Version 1, April 2016.
AOCC (L) mission, functions and tasks are detailed in AD 80-65, however, three main functions could be summarized as:

- Advise the ground commander about related air tactical issues that could have any impact on ground operations in its area of operations (AOO).
- Assist GRF(L) staff on specific issues such as airspace management, ATO feeder staffing, Air Support Requests prioritization, INTEL exchange, etc.
- Coordinate the air component missions conducted over the GRF(L) area of operations that requires a certain level of integration.

**AIR SUPPORT OPERATIONS CENTER**

On the contrary, “The ASOC is the principal air control agency within the TACS, responsible for controlling joint air operations that directly support ground forces”\(^4\). ASOCs, in accordance with USAF and RAF doctrine, are normally collocated with the senior Army fires element and they are responsible for the coordination and control of air component missions in their assigned area.

The existence of an ASOC, in US and UK doctrine, implies the segregation of a defined volume of airspace and the delegation of airspace control and tasking authority on this air entity. BMAS (Battlespace Management Areas) are specific volumes of airspace, up to CA (coordination altitude), where the Ground Commander is the airspace owner. These two concepts and procedures (BMA and CA) are not yet included in NATO doctrine.

ASOCs has been successfully employed in recent conflicts (e.g., Iraq and Afghanistan) where the Air Component had air superiority (even air supremacy) granted from the very beginning but, what will happen when we are facing a peer adversary? What will happen in contested airspace, where air superiority cannot be achieved? In that particular case, who has the most accurate and updated picture? Who has the most robust CIS architecture and C2 system to manage and control the airspace and conduct air operations?

Based on the AIRCOM JFAC concept of operations, centralization is a crucial key for success. Normally, the most robust, interoperable, capable and resilient CIS architecture and AirC2 structure is at JFAC level. Therefore, why not concentrate all cross-component coordination entities at the JFAC level? One feasible option, instead of collocating the AOCC(L) or the ASOC at any land level, could be to concentrate land representatives from fires, airspace management elements, AOAD, AAvn and/or army UAVs in the JFAC installations. The benefits are twofold: Firstly, efficiency will increase for Fires and Airspace Management and, secondly, this reduces the footprint over the AOO.

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\(^4\) ACO DIRECTIVE 80-65. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR AIR OPERATIONS COORDINATION CENTRES LAND AND MARITIME IN ALLIED COMMAND OPERATIONS (25 February 2016).

\(^5\) JP 3-09.3. Close Air Support.
AOCCL VERSUS ASOC

During exercises and operations, the AOCCL main functions are, but not limited to, providing air expertise (mainly in these areas: offensive air operations such as CAS and AI, air defense operations, airspace management and INTEL), tactical liaison with the designated JFAC, and coordination functions relating to the air component operations that can have any impact on land operations. Additionally, if directed by JFAC, the AOCCL could task/re-task assigned air-to-ground missions or act as rear-brief agency, but the airspace control is not considered an AOCCL function or task, according to NATO doctrine or TTPs.

While the AOCC(L) is an entity, permanently collocated with a GRF(L), even when the GRF(L) is appointed as Corps, LCC or JTF HQ; the ASOC is usually collocated with the senior Army tactical echelon (normally at Division level) and its non-permanent location will depend on communications, security and command post configuration.

The AOCCL and ASOC roles and missions could be complementary, played simultaneously, depending on the operational situation and needs, and, if they are directed by the JFAC.

SUMMARIZING

Even though the AOCCL and the ASOC seem to be the same thing, they are not. Manning, areas of expertise, equipment, training, mission and functions make them two completely different air entities.

BMA, CA, even ASOC, concepts and procedures are not yet included, or fully developed in NATO doctrine. This does not mean that they are incompatible with NATO concepts or TTPs, quite the opposite, they are complementary.

The employment of an ASOC in operations implies a JFAC C2 System decentralization and an airspace control and tasking authority delegation over this air entity. To do that, the Air Component has to recognize the necessity and perceive the benefit to of decentralizing its C2 system, creating additional C2 nodes.

A reverse option to the aforementioned JFAC C2 decentralization would be the concentration, in the JFAC HQ facilities, of Land Component personnel fulfilling all those areas that could facilitate the airspace management and fires synchronization (Joint Fire Support Elements, Airspace Management Elements, Joint Fires and Airspace Management Cell, etc).

As NATO doctrine continues to evolve. These are important concepts to consider in order to maximize the lethality of Air Power. NATO may not have, or need, its own "Key West Agreement," but integration of Land and Air Power must continue to be developed in NATO TTPs and doctrine.
HQ NRDC-ESP, Training the Future to be Ready for the Present

Mr. Ignacio Cortiñas Dorado (CIV)
NRDC-ESP Political Advisor

Does NATO currently have the ability and the military capabilities to face the challenges of a near and “New” future? Does the Alliance, as security Organization, understand those challenges? Is NATO’s mindset within 21st century parameters, or has it been left behind? Perhaps NATO is still a Security Organization anchored in the “present”, and hopefully not “the past century”? These questions are what should keep NATO’s big wigs awake. However, when you think about the future, you find, and perhaps write down, questions rather than make assertions.

It is not my intention to answer these questions today, but rather, to draw attention to them. Let me take as a basis, the work that has been done by the people/staff assigned to the HQ NRDC-ESP (Béter Spain) during the final phases of the training programme to attain JTF HQ Certification - Exercise Trident Jackal 19. A very tough programme was created by the G7 Training and Exercises Branch. The first challenge was to plan and execute it “a year earlier” than expected and scheduled. The second challenge, which was more difficult than the first, was to adapt our 21st century mindset to 21st century perception, so as to be capable of dealing with “confusing” situations, in a futuristic scenario, in terms of decision-making factors, rather than in the pleasant present one. In my view, the latter was the real and most difficult challenge of this exercise: “Acting with/within a real 21st century Mindset”, and changing the military focus from kinetic to non-kinetic actions. This was done without neglecting to respond to the first challenge.

It would be too obvious to confront such an interest: Why military forces should change their level of intensity and focus, from pure combat actions to a holistic approach? Would this not be interference with the “other NATO instruments” available, with the aim of achieving the Political Strategic Objectives? Technically speaking, I would answer: Changing focus is a must. It would not be interference, but it would be cooperation and coordination, that would be both requested and required. However, the key, and more sensitive issue, is to reconcile it with the main mission of Military Tools: Fighting.

Military means have historically been deployed to confront “physical aggression”. An act of violence should automatically “be responded to” by using similar measures: by opening fire, organizing military maneuvers, occupation, dominance, etc.” What if the enemy does not strike using such a type of aggression (kinetic), or at least, if it is not done in an obvious way? What if, the way the enemy acts is seriously jeopardizing the cohesion of the Alliance, e.g., by acting through proxies, frightening troop-contributing nations, engaging in hybrid warfare, targeting only particular nations’ interests? What if the Alliance does not prepare its military capabilities and structure to react by other means rather than just using 21st century instruments/concepts against 21st century type actions? If so, the Alliance, in my view, is not responding correctly, in a multipolar and diverse environment. A big destructive war requires significant means, economic sustainability and national willingness. Such a war, presumably, would give the targeted “nation” some time to react, recover and, if possible take the initiative. Limited conflicts - not wars - allow the aggressor to take the initiative to act in a very limited and short time, and reach limited but decisive objectives. However the aggressor must stop before a counter-attack is ordered by the assaulted national authorities. By playing the diplomatic card accurately in the UN, OSCE and EU, the reactions to the aggression would likely be “addressed by the aggressor” in a carefully planned and manipulative way.

The NAC is obviously more than aware of the weakest link that NATO has: “NATO’s Decision Making Process”. Balancing 21st century tools and processes is our challenge. To do so, NATO needs to manage both military and diplomatic actions with at least the same capability as our opponents.
HQ NRDC-ESP has followed an extremely demanding training programme to attain the capability to confront 21st century-type situations, by applying 21st century-type concepts and processes. This is achieved by: managing multiple factors and multifaceted scenarios; thinking more broadly; acting closer to the political rather than to the military side; challenging the enemy through other paths (such as the media and social media); diplomacy; interacting with the population; showing efficient and sufficient military power capabilities, strong enough to deter the enemy; exercising Defence and the Deterrence Concept.

Looking into the process of thought and resolution, we realize that there are a number of “not-purely” military capabilities that need to be properly sourced, trained and coordinated so as to enable the Commander to reach the goal: To prevent the enemy from acting, how and/or where they should not be. Those capabilities that I am referring to are: STRATCOM, POLAD, LEGAD, CULAD, CIMIC, etc., together with, of course, and precisely coordinated with, the other traditional “Js”. The integration of all of these elements proves to be tremendously complex when it is a question of Lethal versus Non-Lethal constraining of military actions for the sake of keeping open any other path in the domain of diplomacy, population perception, or the NATO nation member’s sensitivity, etc.

Adapting a current 21st-century-mindset model to the 21st century, the merging of a number of factors is necessary. Some of these are not within our sphere of control. Planning, Research, Analysis, and finally making Decisions, demand not only, a firm attitude and open minds, but also a set of tools that allows us to conduct those activities in the correct manner. Elaborating on this area pushes us into a field, which is a key element in the depicted process. I am referring to “Disruptive Technology”. A disruptive technology characterizes because it displaces an established technology and shakes up the industry or a ground-breaking product that creates a completely new industry. (Harvard Business School professor Clayton M. Christensen coined the term “disruptive technology”).

Our decision-making processes lack time, agility and effectiveness. Defence capabilities need to be “transformed” to enter into a “futuristic environment” that allows national and Alliance authorities to effectively perform their duties. Because both kinetic (hard power) and grey-space conflict are equally affected, the system of those means, tools and decisions must be seamlessly integrated as a “Full Spectrum Effects”- (General Sir Richard Barrons, UK).

In terms of technology, the main military drivers are: Open source big data, Processing Power, Connectivity boom (5G), ISR and Command & Control.

When NATO (and the nations, individually) decide, and are fully committed to undergoing this required transformation for the future, our lawmakers, politicians and military leaders should be deeply self-convinced of the urgency of taking this path. Furthermore, believing in this concept/path is the only way of “surviving” being efficient and accurately effective for our citizens. Budget management and prioritized investment are required to prepare for a more challenging “present”.

Current tools do not fully allow us to cope with every situation, in an effective manner. Time is more of a factor. - Mostly when our opponents either take the initiative or manage the tempo through “disruptive technology”.

Joint Exercises, such as Trident Jackal 19, open a big door to all its participants, trainers and evaluators, to show that perhaps, the future environment is not going to be what we expect. Moreover, “the present” in which we assume we will continue to live, does not look like the future we foresee. We (NATO and the Nations) need to get closer to both of these temporal parameters. A more open application of Disruptive Technology in NATO’s decision-making process is urgently required.
Are We Living in an Information Warfare Era?

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No matter how much you read, listen to the radio or watch television, fake news in traditional or social media is one of the favourite topics of discussion. In some cases, people realize that, despite the untruthful nature and, potential destabilising effects of this type of media manipulation, it results from the freedom of speech and expression that is one of the cornerstones of our democratic societies. But, most worryingly, if you are interested in current affairs, very frequently you will come across articles, analyses and conferences referring to misinformation and disinformation, originating abroad, and aimed at open democratic societies. You will become aware of the real or potential influence that these external actions have or can have on us.

Is this a new phenomenon resulting from today’s technological advances? The answer must be “No”. History provides many examples of information being used, particularly in times of war or confrontation between nations, to influence adversarial and one’s own population so that one’s objectives are achieved. Today, the speed at which information travels, the size of the target audience, the possibility that the target audience might publicize the opponent’s message, and the capability of any actor to use information for their own benefit, are all characteristics of the way modern societies and current technologies operate. What is different now is the emphasis on information activities and the belief that perception is the main aim of conflict – the centre of gravity in military terms. And, as a result, we are constantly subject to the influence of biased external information, especially when taking decisions or when we are called to action.

Several of the above-mentioned articles and analyses are centred on Russia’s attempts to divide, confuse or demoralize Western societies, in order to advance the Kremlin’s goals. Such attempts were made, on a large scale, during the occupation of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine but have, at least, been resisted since then. The findings of analyses draw attention to the existence of media outlets targeting foreign audiences, the main examples being RT (formerly known as Russia Today) and Sputnik, which are the conduits of Kremlin propaganda. These are, of course, in addition to the outlets following the “official” editorial lines and dedicated to Russia’s internal population. Moreover, investigators identify multiple examples of actions carried out on social media networks which originated in the Internet Research Agency (nicknamed as Saint Petersburg’s troll factory), and actively and abundantly target Western audiences with disinformation daily. It is important to draw attention to the election-related campaigns, as the results of analyses indicate, that they have been carried out by making use of very contentious topics to influence the outcome of several elections and referenda. This has been achieved, mainly, by polarizing the electorate. The strategic objective of this overall disinformation effort, is to weaken and destabilize the West, essentially exploiting the divisions and weaknesses, which already exist, in our societies.

However, not everything happens nationwide. Information activities are also being used on a smaller, tactical scale, and also seek to produce additional side effects. An example of this type of situation is what happened during the conflict in Ukraine. It involved the use of “precise” propaganda, via SMS messages to cell phones, coupled with kinetic strikes: “In one tactic, soldiers receive texts telling them they are ‘surrounded and abandoned’. Minutes later, their families receive a text stating ‘Your son is killed in action,’ which often prompted a call or text to the soldiers. Minutes later, soldiers receive another message telling them to ‘retreat and live,’ followed by an artillery strike to the location where a large group of cell phones were detected”\(^1\). This is just an example of what can happen during an open conflict, but, with a little bit of imagination and with small adjustments, it can happen during a crisis or, even, in peace time, with disruptive effects on the opposing audiences.

One must bear in mind that the above-mentioned activities are consistent with the Gerasimov doctrine – named after Russia’s Chief of the General Staff –, and a government-wide concept that combines hard and soft power at various levels. It transcends peace-war boundaries, sets the basis for the application of hybrid warfare, and fully supports the Primakov doctrine \(^2\) of Russian foreign policy. We are all aware that Gerasimov doctrine puts information confrontation at the forefront of all military and non-military activities carried out across all the stages of conflict development.

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\(^1\) Described by US Army Col Lism Collins in “Russia gives lessons in electronic warfare”, Army Magazine, Aug 2018

\(^2\) Named after Russia’s former foreign and prime minister Yevgeny Primakov
Other reports are focused on Daesh, or the Islamic State. Daesh has used social networking and the news media as tools to project its brutality and disseminate its more-than-radical view of religion into the public domain. Its communications, approach and aggressiveness have enabled Daesh, to popularize its own type of war, in a manner that no other insurgent group has achieved so far. In its campaigning, Daesh has used formal and informal media activists, presenting the audience with carefully-constructed, ideological, religious and emotional appeals, and it has carried out a "marketing" strategy based on a positive narrative, counter-speech argumentation and offensive-media weaponization. Despite the caliphate's physical demise, some researchers believe that the caliphate idea will endure due to the abundant amount of propaganda material remaining on the Internet, and the terrorist menace that it contains.

Regarding China, the strategy of the People's Liberation Army of the Three Warfares (Psychological warfare, Public Opinion warfare and Legal warfare) seeks to use influence activities, via all channels, including online platforms, to support China's objectives. This affects international and domestic perceptions while aiming to undermine the resolve of adversaries, or potential adversaries, in crisis or conflict situations. Analysts agree that China has emphasized the development of this strategy since 2003 and continues to do so. Consistent with this, some reports indicate that China conducts influence operations against cultural institutions, media organizations and other key influencers, in other countries and in international institutions, to condition political establishments and public opinion to accept China's narrative, surrounding its national and party priorities. They cite as an example the influence activities which have helped its efforts in the South China Sea.

In addition, experts agree that other actors also turn to disinformation in their attempts to prevent internal reform and weaken opponents abroad. Examples of these are Venezuela – emulating, to some extent, Russia's approach to information – and the aggressiveness of Iran – at a regional level, against Saudi Arabia and, globally – in its dispute with the UN and other actors regarding its nuclear programme.

The above-mentioned are examples of the application of the so-called sharp power, which is the misleading use of information (by a state, a non-state actor or its proxies) with hostile objectives or aims. Frequently, sharp power activities exploit divisions in our societies, and use our own vulnerabilities and take advantage of our commitment to freedom of speech and the free flow of ideas. Regarding its destabilising intent, sharp power activities are illegitimate according to international law. They must not be confused with the application of soft power, which is legitimate, as part of the influence and cultural capabilities of an actor. As sharp power activities are illegitimate, they can be subject to defensive actions by those who are targeted.

In facing this sharp power challenge, experts warn that Western nations are not acting decisively enough, compared with the aggressiveness and assertiveness of the actors targeting them. All kinds of proposals are presented, ranging from more passive responses, like promoting resilience, to more active ones, like taking punitive actions in the economic and diplomatic realms. What all agree on, is that the West must not respond in kind. Western democratic societies are not to engage in actively promoting misinformation, disinformation, social media hoaxes and other similar actions. Nevertheless, as a result of a clearer awareness of the risks involved, some steps are being taken and, considering that disinformation and misinformation are a transnational phenomenon, some multinational institutions and nations are beginning to collaborate and stand up against organizations and powerful establishments in order to expose propaganda and influence activities that target Western societies. Examples of these institutions and nations are: the EU East StratCom Task Force, the NATO StratCom Centre of Excellence, the US Global Engagement Centre, and several initiatives carried out by private or semi-private think-tanks and entities.

As a result of all the above, it can be concluded that we are living in an era in which the weaponization of information is routine, especially when it comes to certain actors. It is evident that this is taking place daily, and it does not have to take place during times of war or open confrontation, as it did historically. The assertiveness of some actors, along with current technological advances have made our societies more vulnerable to attacks involving information activities. These types of attacks are prevalent and are used whenever an actor considers them effective in helping to achieve its aims. And this is not just the theory, it is the reality, as current studies, analyses and examples have indicated. Some people think that, applying the expression information warfare to some of the activities carried out in the information space, can be too blunt, or even alarmist, due to its war-like connotations. Name it as you wish: opposition, confrontation, struggle, etc. However, terminology will not change, or reduce the efforts of others, to influence our societies in a way which is not in our best interests.

In the military, as in other fields, it has been understood that the information environment constitutes a "new dimension", in which military operations are to be executed to counter the adversaries' efforts. The cognitive domain has been incorporated as part of the framework in which we conduct operations, in addition to the physical (land, maritime and airspace) and virtual (cyberspace) domains. It has also been recognised that every military activity (physical or virtual) impacts on perceptions and affects those audiences in a way that enables us to gain their support, or at least ensure their neutrality.
All NATO military forces, engaged in current operations or in daily activities, are fully aware that operating in a contested information environment, is a reality that cannot and must not be avoided. We routinely train for that. Take, for example, Exercise Trident Jackal 2019. In this, HQ NRDC-ESP trained to plan and conduct non-Article 5 small joint operations, using fictitious scenario settings that presented significant challenges in the information environment. The information warfare, confrontation, struggle, etc. is already part of the landscape in which we live and operate, and we must start to prepare and train for that.

REFERENCES


Use of Force in Contemporary Military Operations: Different Standards

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OVERVIEW

Despite it often being forgotten, there are two legal frameworks in International Law related to the use of force: the framework determined by the International Human Rights Law (hereinafter IHRL) and the International Humanitarian Law or Law of Armed Conflict (hereinafter IHL) framework. In order to discuss the topic we have to refer to the different standards in connection with the use of force: the law enforcement paradigm and the armed conflict one.

The use of force by law enforcement officials is determined by some parameters which, apart from having been included in national legislation and having taken concrete form in legal precedent (internal precedent and case law of the European Courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights) are contained in soft law texts such as in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials1 and the Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials or, in the European area, the Declaration on the Police or the European Code of Police Ethics2.

In an armed conflict, with the application of IHL, there is legitimacy in sacrificing lives – even of those external to the conflict – for the benefit of a desired and necessary result for military purposes, with the principle of proportionality as a limit. Put bluntly, an enemy fighter (who is not hors de combat) can be killed by the mere fact of being one. In addition, deprivation of liberty can occur with little explanation and, of course, without any charge or allegation.

It is a known fact that military forces may perform police functions. There is no shortage of examples nowadays. Operations ATALANTA and SOPHIA, from the European Union, are undoubtedly law enforcement operations.

While the legal framework related to international armed conflict (IAC) is comprehensive, the non-international armed conflict (NIAC) framework is limited to Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions and, if it can be applied, to the brief Protocol II Additional to those conventions. In respect of violent situations that do not reach the threshold application of IHL there is no specific legal framework in international law so, obviously, we must resort to IHRL.

Today, most States accept that the IHRL framework is applicable in an armed conflict situation3. This raises coexistence problems with IHL. ‘Basic human rights’ are referred to, for instance, in articles 72 and 75 of the Protocol I Additional to Geneva Conventions. Putting the two complementary legal systems formerly mentioned into practice, in principle, is only relevant in case of armed conflict. In times of peace, the same situation does not usually occur, while this is not guaranteed4.

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1 ‘Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials’ that as we will see has become a reference point for the use of the force, outside of the paradigm of the armed conflict. Eighth UN Congress on Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, La Habana, Cuba, 27th August to 7th September 1990.
3 International Court of Justice: Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (advisory opinion 8th July 1996). Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (advisory opinion 9th July 2004), Judgement on the Armed Activities in the Territory of The Congo, 19th December 2002.
4 Nonetheless, there is still room for the consideration of IHL as a prevailing legal framework timely in peacetime – a kind of photographic negative of the armed conflict situations – as in the case of the occupation of the ‘La Tablada’ headquarters in Argentina (report no. 55/97 of the Interamerican Commission on Human Rights of 1997, case 1337, Juan Carlos Abella against Argentina). The Commission, in the paragraph 178, states that the attackers of the headquarters put themselves in situation of being legitimate objectives in the same way as combatants, even at a specific time as the one examined.
However, the existence of an international military operation protected by a resolution of the Security Council, or on the basis of the consent of the participants, doesn’t necessarily imply that we find ourselves facing an armed conflict. We must also remember the provision of Article 75, paragraph 8 of the Protocol I Additional: it must not be understood as a limitation of other regimes that offer further protection by virtue of different applicable rules of International Law.

CONTEMPORARY CONFLICTS

The above statements avoid the essential problem that most military contemporary operations encounter. This issue is simply that current conflicts are rarely international armed conflicts, or even armed conflicts in the broad sense, including NIAC. The conflicts to which we are referring do not take place between States, there are no decisive battles, and the concepts of victory and defeat sometimes become diluted into chaos. In fact, many of the current military interventions are not adhered to in any way – or in many of their phases – by IHL. Hence the importance of the rules of engagement or ROE.

But even counting on this instrument, there are many persistent problems to which the Law cannot always find a satisfying solution. IHL & IHRL make very different distinctions in their treatment of the right to life and the right to freedom. When it comes to the right to life, Article 2 in ECHR makes it clear that such right is protected by Law and nobody should be deprived of his life intentionally, except in the execution of a sentence. It establishes in its paragraph 2 a series of exceptions, but especially, its Article 15 – concerning derogations – which reflects that even if a derogation of Article 2 is authorised, this does not proceed in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts of war. It is well-known that the IHRL framework opens doors to IHL, although it entails an evaluation of the acts resulting in death according to the rules of the latter.

According to IHL, in an international armed conflict, any enemy combatant - who is not hors de combat - is a legitimate military target and can therefore be the object of an attack that causes him injury, or even death. It is what is called privilege or immunity of the combatant (the downside is that we are also a legitimate target for the enemy). The most controversial issue in this regard, the so called ‘targeted killing’, has been profusely examined in recent times. Simply put, in this field it is highly important to take into account that there are some actions that can be legally performed in an armed conflict, but not during peacetime.

DETENTION

Detention performed by State organizations is one of the most carefully focused issues in national rights. The development of a whole system for its control has been key in establishing the evolution of protection systems of civil liberties in nations traditionally named civilized, through institutes such as habeas corpus. However, it is now accepted in the policy area – and certainly in the academic one – that the Geneva Convention and its protocols do not answer all situations related to the treatment of the detainees in military operations.

Detention is, basically, the deprivation of physical freedom and the right of movement, and it is therefore this basic right which is the object of protection. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (art. 3), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (art. 9), the American Convention on Human Rights (art. 7), the European Convention of Human Rights (art. 5) and the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (art. 6), refer to such a right (in greater or lesser depth), in its articles.

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There is, included in the restatement of the law of any of the texts mentioned, a presumption in favour of the person's liberty. In addition, any deprivation of liberty has to be executed according to a procedure established by Law. Basically, it consists in a prohibition of arbitrary detentions. It is, however, one of the human rights susceptible to temporary derogation in specific cases provided for under the conventions.

The legal framework concerning people deprived of liberty in the cases in which the IHL can be applied, in armed conflict situations of an international nature, is relatively long and detailed. The landscape changes in situations which differ from International armed conflict. Actually, this is the situation which the military contingent has faced on many occasions during contemporary military operations. In these circumstances, the only clearly applicable framework would be Article 3 common to Geneva Conventions and, in that case, the Protocol II Additional of 28 Articles which, as we already know, says rather little about most things. And, in the event of situations that cannot be identified as armed conflicts, no specific legal framework exists, regarding detention of individuals, in the area of International Law. Ultimately, all acknowledge that in such situations, the basis for detentions – as for any other use of force – would be in the mandate (normally a resolution of the UN Security Council), and its formula for 'all the necessary measures'. Ultimately something quite poor, but maybe sufficient when complemented by procedural aspects.

Evidence of the importance of the topic is the relatively recent development of the Copenhagen process\(^6\) between 2007 and 2012, on the initiative of the Government of Denmark. Little can be said about the process itself, apart from referring to the final product: the so-called 'Principles and Guidelines' embodied in a document spread by the Government of Denmark itself, which have been 'welcomed' by the participants. Apart from the actual principles and guidelines, comments on them are included in the document - these have been written by the presidency, with the participants merely 'taking note' of them.

This final product may not be, for obvious reasons, anything revolutionary, even if we take into account that it is not, a normative text. But what the participants\(^7\) do is recognise that detention is a necessary, legal and legitimate way to achieve the objectives of international military operations. It is still early to assess the effects, but it must be noted that for the first time, we can talk about a minimum shared by very significant States, and a minimum that does refer to essential issues such as the necessity of establishing procedures (operational documents or SOPs) adapted to the circumstances; the obligation to register detentions, to report the reasons for the detention, the conditions of such, the access to the detainees, the transfer of these, and the participation of the ICRC and other organizations.


\(^7\) The participating States are the following: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Canada, China, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, India, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Russia, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, Holland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom & USA. The African Union, EU, NATO, UN, ICRC also participated as observers.

\(^8\) Actually, a long time ago – since the problem was detected, international organizations have developed operative procedures relating to the detention of individuals, some for specific operations (SOP 362 of COMSAF on 'non-BSAF personnel detections, SOP 3026 of KFOR, on detention of 'non-KFOR personnel') or several as an interim regime until the development of a specific policy (Detention in United Nations Peace Operations. UN DPKO, Department of Field Support, Ref. 2010-6-Interim Standard Operating Procedures: Approved 23 Jan 2010).
The Spanish Army keeps NRDC-ESP and ESP HQ CGTAD under the same leadership. All the Spanish personnel are commissioned to the CGTAD as a 3**HQ subordinated to the Head of the Army. The common leadership achieves a remarkable alignment between "national" and "NATO" interests. Doctrine, operational experience, lessons learned and experimentation among others are common ground. The "National Staff" is located in the "Convento de Santo Domingo" barracks in Valencia and provides the NRDC-ESP with liaison and capabilities in three main areas.

First, we have the interaction between NRDC-ESP and other ESP 3** HQs. In this way experiences and lessons learned gained by the ESP Army in operations are compiled and shared to feed NRDC-ESP procedures and improve operational planning. Moreover, coordination of both national and NATO operational planning and exercises is a key factor in providing synergy in this organisation: mutual support between ESP HQ CGTAD and NRDC-ESP is continuously provided to support each other with experienced and skilled personnel for exercises and planning. The National Staff also provides logistic planning and support, by communicating appropriate needs to the national chain of command to keep the Support Battalion equipment, supplies and manning at proper levels and status, according to the Spanish Government's commitment to NATO.

The second main area is related to Universities and think-tanks. ESP HQ CGTAD works permanently with Universities and professional organisations in the city of Valencia to share knowledge and experience; and these activities are shared with NRDC-ESP. As a result of this community of interest, NRDC-ESP have a relevant set of skilled reservists participating in exercises and training events, and the Universities provide special advisors to the commander when needed.

The third relevant aspect is that ESP HQ CGTAD provides NRDC-ESP with a significant interaction between civil society and NATO. Seminars, conferences and social events are organised by ESP HQ CGTAD to showcase NATO to civil society. By doing so, NRDC-ESP and its personnel are fully integrated within the Spanish society. As an example, we can look at the Seminar "NATO @70. A look to its South", with the participation of the ESP Ambassador in NATO, five Universities and Think-Tanks, former Assistant to NATO SECCEN and former Commanders and Chief of Staff in current operations. In addition, important NATO meetings and conferences have been held in the Santo Domingo barracks.

Let’s see how this mutually beneficial interaction is carried out on a daily basis:

**NRDC CGTAD INTERACTION IN LESSONS LEARNED, EDUCATION AND TRAINING**

The Spanish Lessons Learned (LL) process, that records into a data file the experience of national units and headquarters is at disposal of NRDC-ESP, and vice versa: the experiences and LLs of the NRDC as Corps, Land Component Command and Joint Force Command LCC are fed into the national LL process. In addition, the knowledge and experience of all the Spanish personnel working for NRDC-SP are applied in the national training processes.

From a national standpoint, ESP HQ CGTAD Valencia controls the development, education and training of both the Spanish individual staff in the NRDC-HQ individuals and the organic Subordinate Units, thus increasing the common benefit of the organisation. Education and training are focused not only on Unit training but also on individuals. Therefore CGTAD Valencia is responsible for managing courses, activities, seminar and workshop participation, civilian and sports contests, and more.
Related to this, as ESP Army HQ delivers General Plans with instructions, and Missions and Budget are allocated, ESP HQ CGTAD Valencia develops the NRDC Annual Preparation Plan and distributes resources for the HQ and its Subordinate Units. The budget for its own responsibility and within the limits of the procurements authorised are distributed following the NRDC-ESP Commander’s intent and prioritises. ESP HQ CGTAD Valencia ensures the compliance of all of the General Plans and Commander’s instructions.

When NRDC-ESP is required to contribute to external Missions, CGTAD Valencia deals with the required tasks and monitors the development of these contributions.

**CGTAD MANAGEMENT OF PERSONNEL AND MATERIAL**

The Area of Resources in CGTAD has a double responsibility. On one hand, this area has to take care of the human resources, and on the other, it has to manage all the materials that CGTAD, as a whole, needs to accomplish its mission and commitments. The Area is composed of two Staff Sections. This Area works in a close relationship with G1 and G4, as well as the CGTAD subordinate units, Support Battalion and the Military Police Battalion.

Human Resources Section has, as its primary task, the management of all the aspects related to the Spanish national personnel involved in the CGTAD, as a whole, both the appointed personnel and the supporting/reinforcing people and the augmentees. This Section provides a smooth-flowing relationship among the Spanish Army Staff and the CGTAD and its subordinate Units.

Material Resources Section is the second staff component of the Area. Its main task is to manage the CGTAD materials and to sustain the actual use of the vehicles and assets which are needed for deployments and barracks duty life. One essential effort carried out by the Section is the planning of the CGTAD future logistic requirements as well as the replacement of the current materials. Nowadays, this staff Section is fully involved in the substitution of the Collective Protection (COLPRO) tents in a coordinated and cohesive work with the Spanish Logistic Command. This equipment is used to deploy CGTAD Command Post Concept and follows the NATO standards to the same level as other GRFs.

**COMMANDERS PERSONAL STAFF AND SUPPORT**

The Commander, as national commander, has at his disposal a personal staff that consists of legal and economic advisors.

The legal advisors support the Commander in both national and NATO responsibilities and the JAE (economic issues leadership) manages and liaises with the national economic structure in support of the NRDC and CGTAD.

**CGTAD INTERACTION WITH CIVIL SOCIETY AND UNIVERSITY**

The Commander of CGTAD and NRDC is also, as his second national responsibility, the institutional representative of the Spanish Armed Forces and Army, to regional civilian society. This circumstance helps to make NRDC and NATO known to civil society.

CGTAD staff in Valencia, through ARI (institutional relationship Area), in close coordination with VOB, support the Commander in this responsibility and the contact and work with civilian cultural organisations and institutions contributes to NRDC aims. As previously mentioned, it has been especially beneficial to NRDC-ESP HQ due to the participation of special advisors from Valencia University in the Personal Staff.

And finally, Santo Domingo barracks, home base of the CGTAD, is an old building, from the 13th century, in which important ceremonies of NRDC-ESP, or led by this HQ, are sometimes held such as the NATO LC3 meeting in 2018, or the Commander’s annual reception to the Valencian society. The Spanish Support Unit (UAPO) is the unit that provides the necessary support for the successful execution of these events.
NATO’s 70th Anniversary from the HQ NRDC-ESP Perspective

This year, April 4th has marked the 70th anniversary of the signing of the Washington Treaty, which created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It was the beginning of an alliance in which, originally 12 nations, already united by shared history, values and goals, committed to jointly defend one another in the event of an armed aggression against any individual one of them, thus linking the defence of the USA and Canada with a group of Western European nations. That signing created a bond between both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, usually referred to as the transatlantic link. It guarantees peace and security in Europe and in North America and allows us to live our lives in freedom.

NATO is a value-based organization in which the principles of democracy, sovereignty and collective defence are shared among all member states. These values have been reflected in all actions and operations the alliance has carried out since its origins, and continue being relevant in these times of constant change. This demonstrates that the security of NATO allies, on both sides of the Atlantic, is a joint operation. Unity, solidarity and cohesion among the allies constitute the fundamental core of NATO, which has been the cornerstone of its success in these 70 years, a period in which the Alliance has contributed to preserving peace in Europe and other continents, providing security to its member nations.

Since it was founded, NATO has expanded, and increased the number of its member states, from the initial 12 to the current 30, which will become 30 with the anticipated accession of the Republic of North Macedonia. Also, the Alliance seeks to project stability and strengthen security outside its territory through cooperation and partnerships with non-member countries from the Euro-Atlantic area, the Mediterranean, the Gulf region and other parts of the globe. Additionally, NATO cooperates with a range of international organizations, especially with the EU, with which it shares strategic interests and faces the same challenges. This constitutes an undeniable demonstration of NATO’s history of success and of its continuing relevance in the international arena.
The Alliance has evolved throughout its history, and continues to do so, facing the never-ending changes in the international environment. NATO’s adaptation throughout these years, can be demonstrated by the evolution of its strategic thinking, captured in its 7 strategic concepts. At the outset, and for 40 years, NATO successfully deterred the Soviet Union from aggression against Western Europe. In the 1990s, following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the alliance faced new security challenges in Europe, established new forms of political and military cooperation, and helped to end conflicts in the Western Balkans. After September 11th, 2001, NATO took a lead role in the international response in Afghanistan, to prevent the country from becoming a safe haven for international terrorism.

The Washington Treaty, and the allies’ commitment to it, remains applicable and its core principles continue to help preserve Euro-Atlantic peace and stability. Therefore, in the face of ever-changing threats, the alliance continues to adapt by increasing its forward presence in the eastern part of its territory, by boosting the NATO Response Force to react within days, by adopting a Readiness Initiative to improve its ability to reinforce, by agreeing a major update of the NATO Command Structure, by enhancing its efforts to tackle instability and terrorist threats across its South, as well as improving its defensive capabilities in cyberspace.

As a small cog in the wheel of NATO’s history, following the achievement of Full Operational Capability in 2002, HQ NRDC-ESP has been contributing to the goals of the organization we belong to. Since then, we have taken part in some NATO operations, with the deployment to Pakistan in 2005, following the devastating earthquake in Kashmir (the first and only NATO Response Force deployment) and with our contribution of 200 staff members to the HQ ISAF Joint Command, in Afghanistan during 2012. Our routine and daily work continues to make us part of NATO adaptation and evolution, as it can be perceived in the roles that HQ NRDC-ESP has been training for, in these years. We were certified, in exercise Trident Jaguar 14, as Joint Task Force HQ which is able to command Small Joint Operations (Land Heavy). In 2015, we were certified as Land Component Command of the new enhanced NATO Response Force, during exercise Trident Juncture 15. We were deployed to Poland, in exercise Brilliant Jump 2016, leading the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force. And, this year, 2019 we received training to be recertified as Joint Task Force HQ.

We are proud to be part of NATO’s history, so we have marked the 70th anniversary of the alliance with some events. On the actual anniversary date, April 4th, we participated in a Flag Ceremony followed by a Tribute to the Fallen, dedicated to NATO’s flag and to those who have lost their lives in the fight for peace and freedom, under the NATO mandate. We also published articles in two regional newspapers. In the second semester, we carried out a 70km Cohesion March, with 7 teams of staff members, walking in relays from our permanent facilities, in Bétera, to our institutional site in Valencia city centre. Finally, we organized a geostrategic conference-day with panels and round tables dedicated to this NATO anniversary and NATO’s current engagements to the South.

NATO’s 70th anniversary has marked an opportunity to look back to our past and discuss our present, to reflect on what NATO has achieved and is engaged in. But it has also been an opportunity to look ahead to the future of the alliance, as demonstrated by the numerous speeches, articles, studies and analyses carried out throughout the world during this anniversary year. It is widely acknowledged that NATO is as vital to global security as ever.
NRDC-ESP:
A Cultural Diverse and Unique HQ

Lieutenant Colonel Stefano Sbaccanti (ITA-A)
DCOM Office Chief

We are living in an age where calls for and emphasis on diversity have become the norm. There is nowadays considerable research showing organizations with diverse force may enjoy a performance advantage. Groups with members of varied backgrounds, in fact, generate more ideas and encourage individuals to “up their games”. Diversity of thought help “breeding” creativity, driving innovation and, ultimately, solving problems and meeting expectations in new and exciting ways.

Henry Ford, American founder of the Ford Motor Company, once said, “If you always do what you’ve always done, you’ll always get what you’ve always got”. Working with diverse people gives the possibility to grow and opens up new opportunities.

Culture is a product of the social environment and includes a shared sense of values, norms, ideas, symbols, and meaning. It distinguishes between different groups of people and defines how people see the world and interact. Every person’s culture is comprised of a fusion between his or her different boundaries, such as professional, organizational, and national. Furthermore, culture is always evolving in different ways.

As such, culture is the lens through which we all evaluate everything around us; we evaluate what is proper or improper, normal or abnormal. People normally use their own culture as the standard to judge other cultures.

The Military is no exception. Military culture is largely unique and defined by its organizational structure, framework and rules. Both the characteristics of the individual and the military structure itself contribute to military culture. While all cultures integrate individuals, the military in particular needs a collective, strong and cohesive culture, allowing it to operate functionally during crises.
This is very true for NATO. In fact, 29 different Countries, soon to be 30, base their commitment on the principles of multinationalism, multiculturalism, interoperability and diversity in order to ensure a solid Alliance and, ultimately, guarantee an effective collective defense.

At NRDC-ESP we are fortunate enough to work in an environment with colleagues representing 11 different nationalities: France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and Spain as the framework nation. Our close team working culture brings daily many opportunities to experience the benefits of working in a multinational and multicultural environment. We all share the same military codes of conduct and values: nonstop training, self-improvement, personal engagement, health, personal responsibility, obedience, discipline, self-sacrifice and trust.

NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, said, “...To be relevant NATO must be prepared for the unexpected and stand ready to sustain our efforts for the years to come.” To this very end, our Command hosts a vibrant multinational community with a clear focus on one common goal: being able to plan and execute operations, both for NATO or the EU, in order to support collective defense, crisis response operations or the sustainment of extant operations. Our Team strives every day to achieve flawless execution of base-related activities, logistic and communications tasks, as well as complex national and international exercises and real-world deployments and operations. It requires quality and agility, particularly across Divisions and hierarchies. As with most other NATO bodies, building teams needs to happen despite challenges of high turnover, different military, civil, professional or national backgrounds and leadership styles, relatively little influence on recruitment, limited traditional positional power, fixed staff size, increasing workload and challenging time constraints.

Cultural diversity is important because our countries, our workplaces, our schools consist more and more of various cultural and ethnic groups. We must learn from one another, but first we must reach a higher level of understanding about each other in order to facilitate collaboration and cooperation. Learning about other cultures helps understanding different perspectives within the world in which we live and helps get rid of negative stereotypes and personal biases. Furthermore, it is clear that to be respected and supported, the Armed Forces must represent the whole society and should reflect the rich multicultural diversity of our current societies. To such extent, military personnel are to be drawn from all walks of life, bringing with them a unique blend of skills, strengths and knowledge.

We may think that we still have a choice whether to accept cultural diversity or not. It is not true: we are already becoming more diverse with each day that passes. The truth is, every person can make a unique and positive contribution to wider society because of, rather than in spite of, our differences.
The Capture of Fort Eben Emael
Lessons for the Contemporary Joint Level,
Drawn from a Tactical Raid

Lieutenant Colonel Sebastian Busenthuer (DEU-A)
Former Military Assistant to Commander

“The opportunity to secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.”
(Sun Tzu)

In autumn 1939, after the successful war against Poland, Hitler ordered a plan to be developed for the attack against France. The Schlieffen Plan in 1914, ended in a long and ghastly trench war, because the planned envelopment of Paris was disrupted by Belgian, British, and French Armies. In 1940, the overwhelming Blitzkrieg tactic, which showed great success in the East, was adopted by the operation Fall Gelb. The German Army Group B, was assigned the mission to invade Holland and Belgium, to force the Allied mobile forces into neutral Belgium. Army Group A then conducted the Sichelschnitt (sweep of the scythe) through the Ardennes region, to split the British and French Armies and trap them in Belgium. The whole Operation of Army Group B depended on the capture of three strategic bridges over the Albert Canal and Fort Eben Emael, overwatching these bridges. If the Fort was neutralized and thus the bridges were captured intact, the heartland of Belgium would lay open to the German Army Group B.

On 10 May 1940, 86 German Paraengineers of the Sturmgruppe Granit, attacked the Belgian Fort Eben Emael. The Fort, seen as the strongest fortress in the world, was defended by 883 men and was believed to be impregnable. Despite the facts that the Germans were outnumbered ten to one, and the Belgian Fort was heavily armed, Sturmgruppe Granit won the battle for three reasons. All soldiers of the Sturmgruppe Granit had internalized their commanders’ intent. This circumstance was arranged by extensive preparation and the use of mission command tactics. The Germans also understood that it was important to use surprise factor, for the execution of the operation. They overwhelmed and confused the enemy by using unexpected technologies like gliders and shaped charges. This allowed them to silence the main gun systems within 25 minutes from the beginning of the battle. The use of combined-arms warfare is the last of the three reasons which maximized the combat power of the relatively small unit. By using close-air support they were even able to withstand numerous Belgian counterattacks.
THE TRAINING AND THE APPROACH

On 28 October 1939, General Kurt Student, commander of the 7th Airborne Division, received a direct order from Adolf Hitler to prepare an attack on Fort Eben Emael and three adjacent bridges over the Albert Canal. General Student wasted no time getting Hitler’s plan going. He created a highly specialized unit, Sturmbteilung Koch, which was named after its leader Hauptmann (Captain) Walter Koch. Sturmguppe Granit, a subordinate company-sized unit, consisting of specially trained airborne assault pioneers (Engineers or Paraengineers), was led by the brilliant Oberleutnant (First Lieutenant) Rudolf Witzig.

On 03 November 1939 this unit began training for the most important task of the operation, the neutralization of Fort Eben Emael. Together with his experienced Senior Non-Commissioned Officer, Feldwebel (Sergeant) Wenzel, Witzig trained his men to the maximum extent. He used a large training area near Hildesheim, where he set up a replica of Fort Eben Emael which had the same size and surface soil as the original.

It served perfectly to train the landing of the gliders as well as the coordination between the squads on the ground. But it lacked one necessity – the facility to train on the bunkers, and casemates to assemble and emplace the newly-developed charged charges. Thus Sturmguppe Granit needed a large-scale model of a similar fort to practise on. This was found at the Benes line fortification, in Sudentenland, at the German-Czechoslovakian border. It was there, where Oberleutnant Witzig drilled his men to perfection. This preparation, in combination with Witzig’s personal leadership philosophy, guaranteed that every single soldier knew exactly what to do. “He [Witzig] was no ‘yes’ man. Before he accepted an order, he took the time to study it. Before he agreed to carry it out, he had to be convinced, in his own mind that it would succeed. High on the list of criteria an order should meet, was that each man involved had a reasonable chance of coming out of the mission alive.” But most importantly, the men were aware of which part their task played in the importance of the overall mission. They internalized their commander’s intent - a precondition which turned out to be of utmost importance throughout the course of the mission.

Despite the long and thorough preparation and training for the operation, small mistakes in the earliest hours caused the loss of two gliders. The first glider, containing the leader of Sturmguppe Granit, Oberleutnant Witzig, went down after the towrope snapped because the towing Ju52 banked to avoid a collision with another aircraft. An overloaded glider may have caused the towrope to snap. The second glider went down due to an unaccountable mistake of the Ju52 pilot. The glider pilot realized that they had not reached the scheduled height for the release, and refused to unlatch. But finally the Ju52 pilot forced him to release when he conducted a dive manoeuvre. Despite a well-coordinated plan and meticulous preparation, Sturmguppe Granit was reduced to 70 men, or 80% of combat power, at the very beginning of the approach. Without having fired a single shot, they suffered the loss of two Sturmgrupps and, the most important loss, their leader, Oberleutnant Witzig. After realizing that their leader was missing, Feldwebel Wenzel took over the command. He was the senior NCO of Sturmguppe Granit. As a direct result of Auftragstaktik (mission command), he knew the plan in every detail, so he was fully prepared and he was aware of the commander’s intent. These three preconditions were fundamental to the success of the mission.

Good preparation, including coordinated training, is key for the success of a mission. Units, in which men are aware of their tasks, and most importantly, understand their tasks in the context of the higher command, have the best opportunity for success. The easiest way to achieve this degree of understanding is extensive preparation, using quality training and rehearsals. If every soldier understands and internalizes the commander’s intent in the sense of Auftragstaktik, even the loss of a leader can be compensated.

This lesson can be found in modern Joint Doctrine. Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 01 points out that “Command is an intrinsically forceful, human activity, involving authority as well as personal responsibility and accountability. Command philosophy has four facets: a clear understanding of the superior commander’s intent; a responsibility on the part of subordinates to meet that intent; the importance of making a timely decision; and a determination, on the part of the commander, to see the plan through to a successful conclusion. This philosophy promotes a decentralized style of command based on freedom and speed of action, and initiative, while remaining responsive to superior direction. This style is commonly referred to as mission command.”
THE GERMAN ASSAULT
THE FAILED BELGIAN COUNTERATTACKS

The biggest concerns of Oberleutnant Witzig who finally arrived at 08:30 were that it was necessary to prevent the Belgians from bringing their guns back into action and the danger of Belgian counterattacks. Sturmgruppe Granit had to hold the positions until they would be relieved by German ground forces. According to the initial plan, the relief was scheduled for 11:00, but they were hours behind schedule because of destroyed bridges. It was going to be a long wait for the men of Sturmgruppe Granit. Several Belgian counterattacks were attempted both from inside the Fort, and from the nearby village of Wonock. But the Belgian artillerymen were poorly trained in infantry tactics, and the commander of the Fort, Major Jottrand, did not have the ability to gain proper situational awareness. They never knew how many German soldiers really fought on top of Eben Emael and where they were positioned. During the day, Belgian artillery fire started to come down on the Fort, trying to force the Sturmgruppe off the exterior. But the fire coming from, both their own field artillery and other surrounding fortresses, could never be coordinated, consequently it failed to produce any effect.

By using surprise, the German glider men gained tactical advantage over an enemy that was ten times their strength. The Belgians were prepared to repel an attack by both ground and conventional air forces, but they never took into account the possibility of being attacked by a light and fast glider force. The casemates and cupolas had been designed to withstand heavy artillery and air attacks. The use of the newly-developed shaped charges caught the Belgians completely unprepared. Surprise is a simple tool to achieve tactical advantage over an enemy. Hence, an enemy can be overwhelmed when he is unprepared. It allows the upper hand to be gained over the enemy, by shortening his time to react decisively. It also permits an attack with a smaller force and the reduction of losses.

AJP-03(B) refers to surprise as follows: "... surprise (a principle of war, and one of the most significant contributors to success at all levels of warfare, built on speed, security and deception, and fundamental to shattering an opponent’s cohesion). The key is not necessarily to engage an enemy who is unaware, but to engage him at a point in which he is too late to react effectively."

The second reason for the success of Sturmgruppe Granit was surprise. At 04:10, fifteen minutes prior to the scheduled time of landing, the gliders touched ground on the top of Fort Eben Emael. After landing at a distance of ten to forty metres from their designated targets, the glidermen dismounted and started their attacks simultaneously. By the time the Belgian defenders identified the incoming gliders, they were too low to aim at effective targets. The best opportunity to defeat the attack early had been lost. The main targets of the Germans, now led by Feldwebel Wenzel, were the heavy artillery guns hidden in the cupolas and casemates which were able to cover the bridges north of the Fort. The main enemy positions were attacked by using 50kg shaped charges, a new technology used for the first time in war. This thoroughly-planned and frequently-practised first phase of the operation was accomplished after just twenty minutes. All the important long-range weapons, posing a threat to the ground forces that were following, had been silenced.

Although the men of Sturmgruppe Granit were primarily engineers, they had brilliant infantry skills. Moreover they were well equipped with infantry weapons, and flame throwers, to withstand smaller counterattacks. But the main reason why the outnumbered Germans were able to repel the larger Belgian counterattacks, was the availability of Sturzkampfbomber (Stuka). These German dive bombers provided close air support. Hence, they could fight jointly, possessing more and superior firepower in abundance.
For an outnumbered unit, it is difficult to win a battle against a technologically and numerically superior enemy. Combined arms warfare or “jointness” is a key element of operations, both then and now. The combination of the firepower of different elements is fundamental to reach fire superiority. A large emphasis has to be placed on the coordination of all available assets. Oberleutnant Witzig’s idea to practise the communication between his forces, and the Stuka pilots, prior to the mission, turned out to be invaluable.

AJP-05 defines: “The joint functions are a framework that provides the commander and staff a means to visualize the activities of the force and to ensure all aspects of the operation are addressed.” These fundamentals used in 1940 are still valid and can be found in AJP-05. It states that “In planning, as well as in the conduct of operations, the joint functions describe fields of activities which are not separated, but are in fact mutually combined and balanced for the desired outcome.” Units or Headquarters unable to conduct combined arms and joint operations generate less combat power and may not accomplish their mission.

CONCLUSION

Fort Eben Emael was the strongest fort of its days. Its capture neutralized the capacity to support the Belgian positions, along a critical length of the Albert Canal. The fort was the key to Belgium and, in a larger sense, it unlocked the door to the West. 79 years ago, the capture of Fort Eben Emael changed known warfare. It remains one of the greatest raids in the history of air assaults. The way it was planned, prepared, and conducted can still be used to provide lessons for military leaders in the 21st century even at operational level. Oberleutnant Witzig was able to prepare his men for this complicated mission, in the best sense of Auftragstaktik, by providing clear directions and communicating his intent. His men internalized their commander’s intent and applied the fundamentals of surprise and combined arms operations in a perfect manner, although Oberleutnant Witzig was not present during the decisive phase of the assault. The lessons of this battle have not lost their validity in almost 80 years. They are vital parts of modern doctrine within NATO and armed forces all over the world.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The 175th Anniversary of the Founding of the Guardia Civil

2019 is nearing its end and the Guardia Civil is closing the year with different commemorative events in honour of its 175th anniversary. It is proud of its legacy and is committed to maintaining its position in Spanish society as the institution most valued by Spaniards.

The events celebrated during the last few months have received tremendous attention from Spaniards and much recognition from the Institutions. Firstly, it is worth highlighting the commemorative event, presided over by Their Majesties the King and Queen of Spain, last May, in the Armoury Square of the Royal Palace in Madrid. Secondly, we draw attention to the recognition received from the Spanish Congress and Senate, when the President of Congress, Ana Pastor, referred to the Guardia Civil as “un ser grande, eficaz y de robusta vida” (a great, efficient and robust being), which she quoted from Benito Pérez Galdós’ reference to the founding of the Guardia Civil in “Episodios Nacionales”.

The different acknowledgements have praised the ability that the Guardia Civil has had to adapt to any public security challenge throughout its history. It rose as a police force with extensive capabilities, and has managed to keep its foundational values unaltered. These values include honour, abnegation, austerity and loyalty.

Today the Guardia Civil is a modern institution which keeps its military identity intact while at the same time successfully integrating and participating in a variety of international work programmes, either as a police force or as a gendarmerie-type force. It faces some of the greatest challenges Spain has experienced in recent history, in particular, the threat of terrorism. Its versatility provides the State with a useful tool which enables it to handle a variety of scenarios in international missions. This is due to its capacity to intervene in every phase of conflict.

FOUNDATION OF THE GUARDIA CIVIL

The Guardia Civil was founded on 28th of March, 1844 by Royal Decree, as an Infantry and Cavalry special armed force called Guardias Civiles. The responsibility of organizing the institution was given to Field Marshall Francisco Javier Girón y Ezpeleta, II, Duke of Ahumada.
The emergence of the Guardia Civil as a military force has marked its historical path as an Armed Force with a military identity and it is therefore an essential part of the Military Family. Its close relationship with the Army, on which it was dependent until the late 1980s, has shaped the recruitment of its members and the training of a great number of its officers who still spend their first two academic years in the Military Academy of Zaragoza.

It would be impossible to understand the success of the Guardia Civil in all of its action fields, without looking at its origin and subsequent involvement, in close collaboration, for several decades, with its alma mater, the Army, in expeditionary campaigns and regional insurrections. This is what forged and strengthened the virtues that the founder wanted to instil in each Guardia Civil member.

“La Guardia Civil desempeñará exclusivamente en campaña el servicio peculiar de su instituto, sin que nadie pueda distraerla, sino los Generales Comandantes, cuando lo consideren necesario, o quieran emplearla en acciones de guerra y comisiones de peligro al frente del enemigo”

(“The Guardia Civil will exclusively and diligently perform the particular service of its institution, without being distracted by anyone except the General Commanders when they deem it necessary or if they wish to use it in war actions or dangerous operations when threatened by the enemy.”)

THE GUARDIA CIVIL IN 2019

The Guardia Civil presence is nationwide, where it exercises responsibility for citizen security in 84% of the national territory and the entire sea territory. In order to carry out its duties it relies on 75,000 personnel and 2,000 stations. In 2018, the Guardia Civil carried out 7,250 daily patrols, travelled 387 million kilometres and performed 246,000 first aid and rescue missions. The Guardia Civil also carried out 41,500 surveillance services in school zones and gave 13,000 lectures to students. Additional notable contributions include 2,400 health care interventions and 1,400 speeches to the elderly.

SPECIFIC MISSIONS

To accomplish all of its tasks the Guardia Civil has more than 75,000 members belonging to 25 special units, including: Traffic Control, Nature Conservation (SEPRONA), the Air Service, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Nuclear, Radiological and Biological Defence (NRBQ), the Maritime Service and Underwater Activities, the Mountain Rescue Service, the Customs Service, Inspection of Arms, Investigation Units and Special Intervention Units (UEl, CAR y GRS). Currently the Guardia Civil has a presence abroad, and participates in different international missions, cooperating with police from different countries.

GUARDIA CIVIL RESOURCES FOR THE ARMED FORCES

The Guardia Civil is dependent on the Ministry of the Interior. However, in the case of armed conflict, a state of siege or the development of military missions, it is dependent on the Ministry of Defence.

The Guardia Civil Unit in HQ-NRDC-ESP is an example of the institution’s firm commitment to military police and judicial police duties, giving continuity to the traditional integration of Guardia Civil cells, in contingents of troops or military units, in accordance with Royal Decree 1438/2010 of November 5th regarding military missions, which can be entrusted to Guardia Civil.

This unit is firmly committed to fulfilling the mandate received in 2002 which provides the HQ-NRDC-ESP with a qualified police assessment element for military police tasks. This allows liaison with police and civilian authorities in host nations, etc. Its main objective for the years ahead is to consolidate the role of the Guardia Civil in the HQ, allowing it to work dutifully for our chain of command and to strive for lifelong training so that it can respond to society’s needs year after year. The Guardia Civil will always strive to be prepared to diligently accomplish any mission assigned to it.

Artículo 129 del Reglamento para el Servicio de Campaña, aprobado por la Ley de 5 de enero de 1882.
During the year 2019, the Spanish Army celebrates the 525th Anniversary of the creation of the Sergeant rank.

Five hundred and twenty-five years, which is like saying the whole life of our Army, born in the late fifteenth century as a result of the creation of the first permanent army of the known world, the Sergeant has been, is and will be the soul of the noncommissioned officers Corps, the spirit that permeates history and tradition with its way of being and existence.

At the end of the fifteenth century, there are three historical circumstances that influence the creation of the Sergeant rank: the end of the Reconquest, the discovery of America and the creation of permanent armies.

There is a change in military art - empowerment of infantry to the detriment of cavalry. The Company appears as the basic organization of infantry, the castration is performed, the artillery is reformed, the portable weapons are delivered to the soldier and the evolutions are normalized. Even "specialists" appear as the people who are trained to perform a profession or trade of a technical nature.

The Catholic Monarchs organize the first permanent army. Fernando with his war experience and Isabel who was visionary in what we would call the Intendance, in logistics and, in the promotion of the first field hospitals and apothecaries.

The first reference to the rank of Sergeant is in a Royal Provision of 1493, when the Catholic Monarchs create a corps of cavalry troops called "Old Guards of Castile", in which each company, under the command of a Captain, include a Sergeant, This is the first appearance of the rank. A year later, in 1494 King Fernando “El Católico” signs his ordinances of what would become the first regular and permanent military units of the Spanish Army, and in which the figure of the Sergeant is already part of the military organization.

The chronicles say that it was the Captains who asked the King to create the rank of Sergeant since those first companies only had a Captain and a Second Lieutenant (alférez). Below them were the Corporals. The Captains and Lieutenants were in charge of nearly 800 men, already with a variety of weapons. This First Sergeant - one per company - was the third officer of the unit. This rank had a wide range of responsibilities, including missions, highlighting logistics, administrative duties and training.

In 1534, Carlos I included the Sergeant in an Infantry unit, when he created the "Spanish Tercios" of Naples and Milan. He would shake half of the world for his limitless courage, his knowledge of Military Art and his exceptional warrior virtues. It is the period of greatest splendor of the Army and the Sergeant, who is responsible for the duties described above and has the added responsibility of instructing each of the different elements of this perfect war machine (pike-man, arquebusiers and musketeers).

During the seventeenth century, the Sergeant’s fame darkens at the same pace as the fame of the Thirds with the decline of the Empire. But it will not be until the Ordinances of Carlos III, in 1768, [Ordinances that were in force until 1787], that it will finally appear, consolidated as a hierarchical rank - albeit as an enlisted rank. As the complexity of war tactics increases, the number of Sergeants per company increases to three, and the post of First Sergeant is created.

In 1912, a Law is published in which two categories are created in enlisted corps (one consisting of Soldier, First Soldier, Corporal, and another of the Sergeant, Master Sergeant and NCO rank). Servicemen who had at least six months of service were allowed to apply for the sergeant posts. They were required to sit an examination.

But it is not until 1931, that the Government of the Republic, signs a Law that, for the first time, organizes and recognizes the prestige of this group, laying the foundations of the newly created NCO corps (in which the Sergeant is not yet included). It is composed of First Sergeants, Master Sergeants, "subayudantes" and Sergeant Majors. Subsequently, in 1934, the Sergeant is integrated into the NCO Corps, and remains there to this day.
Forty years later, in 1974, in the “Camp Martín Alonso”, in Tremp (Lérida), the “Academia General Básica de Suboficiales” (Non-commissioned Military School) is created. This is where the common non-commissioned training course is taught. It is the birthplace of the “Básica” (commonly call NCO in our School). After that, forty-four promotions, and twenty-seven thousand three hundred and forty-four Sergeants graduated from the Academy. In 1993, the first female sergeant, belonging to the XVII Promotion, graduates, being the first of seven hundred and ninety-one who have done so until this year.

Two months before, Law 13/1974 on the organization of the Basic Non-commissioned Corps was passed. This was created due to the need for younger staff, with high levels of technical experience and adequate knowledge. It required a renewal of the training system of the NCO Corps, in which the formation of the noncommissioned officers was regulated for the first time in the 525 years of the history of the Sergeant. This is like saying that the noncommissioned officers are a “fundamental echelon and essential element” of the Army and we must “love and care” for them.

Currently, Military Education, for those who join the NCO Corps, takes place over a period of three years. After an initial period at AGBS (NCO School) where students receive general military training, they continue in the academies of their respective specialties in which, in addition to continuing with their specific military training, they pursue studies to obtain a degree of “Superior Technician” in the General Educational System.